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ARTICLES 
STANDING OF INTERVENOR-DEFENDANTS 
IN PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION 
Matthew I. Hall*
  
 
Unless the plaintiff has a personal stake in the outcome, Article III of the 
United States Constitution requires federal courts to dismiss a plaintiff’s 
claim for lack of standing.  That much is clearly established by decades of 
precedent.  Less understood, however, is the degree to which Article III also 
requires defendants to possess a personal stake.  The significance of 
defendant standing often goes unnoticed in case law and scholarship, 
because the standing of the defendant in most lawsuits is readily apparent:  
any defendant against whom the plaintiff seeks a remedy has a personal 
interest in defending against the plaintiff’s claim. 
But the issue of standing to defend takes on outsized importance when 
third parties who are not targeted by the plaintiff’s requested remedy seek 
leave to intervene in order to oppose the plaintiff’s claim for relief.  In 
cases featuring intervenor-defendants—often cases that concern important 
issues of public law—the personal-stake requirement becomes a real and 
not merely theoretical concern for the defendant.  The problem is well 
illustrated by pending cases that address the constitutionality of 
California’s Proposition 8 and the federal Defense of Marriage Act.  In 
each case, the executive branch officials named as defendants declined to 
defend the challenged law, prompting a nonparty with a questionable 
personal stake to seek to intervene to defend against a plaintiff’s claim.  
The prevailing plaintiff-centered model of standing does not lend itself 
readily to assessing whether such volunteer defendants have an interest 
sufficient to create a case or controversy. 
This Article develops a model of defendant standing based on the 
functions that standing doctrine is intended to serve, and derived from the 
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cases in which the U.S. Supreme Court has considered the personal stake of 
defendants under Article III.  Under this model, absent a traditional injury 
in fact, intervenor standing to defend in public law litigation is appropriate 
only where state or federal law confers on the intervenor the authority to 
represent the government’s interest.  This Article then illustrates the 
application of that model in the Proposition 8 and DOMA cases, and 
concludes that the intervenors in the Proposition 8 litigation do have 
standing to defend, while the intervenors in the DOMA litigation do not. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The doctrine of standing is generally understood to limit the ability of 
plaintiffs to seek relief in federal court.  Courts attribute the doctrine to 
Article III’s restriction of federal jurisdiction to “Cases” and 
“Controversies,” and the need to maintain a proper balance of power among 
the three branches of the federal government.  What has gone largely 
unnoticed in the decades since the Supreme Court began to develop the 
standing doctrine is the degree to which Article III restricts who may defend 
against a claim in federal court.  This aspect of standing doctrine is so 
under-appreciated that some courts and scholars have even asserted, 
incorrectly, that Article III’s standing restrictions apply only to plaintiffs, 
while other courts have used aspects of the plaintiff standing doctrine to 
enforce limits on defendant standing sub rosa.1
Pending cases addressing the constitutionality of California’s Proposition 
8,
 
2 and the federal Defense of Marriage Act3 (DOMA) illustrate the 
circumstances in which issues of defendant standing may be contested, and 
they highlight the inadequacy of our plaintiff-centered model of standing to 
guide courts to sensible results in such cases.  In both the Proposition 8 and 
DOMA cases, the executive branch officials named as defendants declined 
to defend the challenged law in whole or in part, prompting a nonparty to 
seek to intervene to contest the plaintiff’s claims.4
 
 1. See infra Part II.B. 
  This unusual procedural 
posture raises the question whether the existence of an Article III case or 
controversy depends on a showing that the defendant, as well as the 
plaintiff, has a personal stake in the outcome of the litigation.  If, as many 
observers expect, the Proposition 8 and DOMA cases reach the Supreme 
Court, the highly significant merits questions that those cases raise may turn 
 2. See  Perry v. Brown, --- F.3d ----, Nos. 10-16696, 11-16577, 2012 WL 372713 (9th 
Cir. Feb. 7, 2012). 
 3. DOMA has been challenged in a number of pending actions in different federal 
courts. See, e.g., In re Levenson, 587 F.3d 925 (9th Cir. 2009); Smelt v. Cnty. of Orange, 
447 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 2006); Dragovich v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 764 F. Supp. 2d 1178 
(N.D. Cal. 2011); Windsor v. United States, No. 10-civ-8435 (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 9, 2010); 
Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010); Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. 
Supp. 2d 1298 (M.D. Fla. 2005); In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004); see 
also infra Part II.C. 
 4. In the Proposition 8 litigation, the sponsors of the ballot initiative sought to defend 
the measure.  In several pending DOMA cases, certain members of the United States 
Congress have sought to intervene to defend the constitutionality of DOMA after Attorney 
General Eric Holder announced that the Department of Justice would no longer defend 
section 3 of DOMA in court. See infra Part II.C. 
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on the precise manner in which Article III restricts who may defend a claim 
in federal court. 
Problems of defendant standing have largely escaped notice because they 
arise infrequently.  In most cases, the defendant’s personal stake is perfectly 
clear.  When a plaintiff demands relief against a defendant—usually in the 
form of damages or an injunction—the defendant’s exposure to the risk of 
an adverse judgment suffices to create standing to defend.5  Contested 
issues of defendant standing thus arise only in unusual circumstances:  (1) 
in the trial court, when nonparties seek to be heard through intervention, 
and (2) on appeal, when parties against whom no relief was ordered seek to 
overturn the trial court’s judgment.  Because these circumstances occur 
most commonly in public law cases with significant policy implications, 
one might expect to find serious studies of defendant standing in the case 
law and the academic literature.  In fact, however, the topic has been all but 
ignored.  Many law review articles have addressed standing to sue, but not 
one has comprehensively considered the question of how standing doctrine 
limits who may defend a claim.6
This Article seeks to provide much-needed clarity in this neglected field 
of standing doctrine.  I argue that, without articulating a clear theoretical 
basis for doing so, the Supreme Court has often treated the defendant’s 
personal stake in the litigation as essential to the existence of a case or 
controversy.  But the Court has done so in a confused and haphazard 
fashion, thus providing insufficient guidance to lower courts and creating an 
added measure of mischief in cases that concern what I call volunteer 
defendants—that is, parties not sued by the plaintiff, who seek to intervene 
as defendants.  I respond to these problems by proposing a rubric for 
analyzing issues of defendant standing in public law cases, and 
demonstrating its superiority to current doctrine in terms of both theoretical 
consistency and ease of application. 
  No less problematically, the courts that 
have addressed this subject have developed no coherent theory and thus 
have produced ill-considered and inconsistent outcomes. 
The Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I identifies the core requirements 
of a “case or controversy” under Article III as developed in the many cases 
that explore whether the plaintiff has standing to maintain an action.  Part II 
argues that Article III’s Cases or Controversies Clause limits not only who 
may bring a claim, but who may defend it.  It also explains why standing to 
defend is rarely litigated, and illustrates the circumstances under which 
defendant standing issues can arise, by examining two high-profile cases 
that address the constitutionality of laws that prohibit marriage between 
individuals of the same sex.  Part III discusses the Court’s past application 
of both Article II and Article III standing principles to defendants, critiques 
the Court’s under-theorized approach, and advances a new model for 
 
 5. See infra Part II.A. 
 6. For a thoughtful discussion of some of these issues in the context of standing to 
appeal, see Joan Steinman, Shining a Light in a Dim Corner:  Standing to Appeal and the 
Right to Defend a Judgment in the Federal Courts, 38 GA. L. REV. 813 (2004). 
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applying justiciability doctrine to defendants.  Finally, Part IV applies the 
proposed test for defendant standing to the pending Proposition 8 and 
Defense of Marriage Act litigation, and demonstrates that the Proposition 8 
intervenors have standing to defend, while the DOMA intervenors do not. 
I.  CONVENTIONAL STANDING DOCTRINE 
This part provides context for the problem of defendant standing by 
describing how the Cases or Controversies Clause applies in the more usual 
case to restrict the standing of plaintiffs to assert particular claims for relief. 
A.  Plaintiff Standing 
Standing doctrine is commonly said to be derived from Article III of the 
U.S. Constitution, which extends federal jurisdiction only to specified 
categories of “Cases” and “Controversies.”7  The Supreme Court has 
construed this jurisdictional grant to limit federal jurisdiction to disputes in 
which a plaintiff demonstrates a sufficient “personal stake” in the outcome.8  
More specifically, standing doctrine, in its most common application, 
requires the plaintiff to “‘show that he personally . . . suffered some actual 
or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the 
defendant’ and that the injury ‘fairly can be traced to the challenged action’ 
and ‘is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.’”9
The Court has also declared that standing does not exist when “the 
asserted harm is a ‘generalized grievance’ shared in substantially equal 
measure by all or a large class of citizens.”
 
10  A party’s alleged injury that 
involves nothing more than “harm to his and every citizen’s interest in 
proper application of the Constitution and laws” generally is insufficient to 
support standing.11
 
 7. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
  Thus, when the injury alleged is an injury to the desire 
 8. Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976) (stating that “the 
standing question in its Art. III aspect ‘is whether the plaintiff has alleged such a personal 
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to warrant his invocation of federal-court 
jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court’s remedial powers on his behalf’” (quoting 
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975))). 
 9. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 
454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (citations omitted); see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 
(1984)). 
 10. Warth, 422 U.S. at 499; see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573 
(1992). 
 11. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573; see also Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan?  
Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 181, 200–01 (1992) 
(arguing that the Court in Lujan treated the ban on generalized grievances as constitutional in 
nature, and emphasized “that Article III requires something more than [a request for] relief 
that no more directly and tangibly benefits [the plaintiff] than it does the public at large”).  
The extent to which Lujan transformed the prohibition on generalized grievances into a 
constitutional, rather than a prudential, aspect of standing doctrine has been the subject of 
some disagreement. Compare Sunstein, supra, with David J. Weiner, The New Law of 
Legislative Standing, 54 STAN. L. REV. 205, 222–24 (2001). 
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of a citizen or taxpayer to have the government simply follow the law, 
standing is absent—in part because “the political process, rather than the 
judicial process, may provide the more appropriate remedy.”12  When an 
asserted injury “arises from the government’s allegedly unlawful regulation 
(or lack of regulation) of someone else . . . .  [S]tanding is not precluded, 
but it is ordinarily ‘substantially more difficult’ to establish.”13
The Court, and some scholars, have also found support for aspects of 
standing doctrine in Article II of the Constitution.
 
14  Article II confers the 
executive power on the President,15 and provides that the President “shall 
take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”16  Steven Calabresi and 
Kevin Rhodes, among others, have argued that the President must have 
control and supervision over all exercises of discretionary executive 
power.17  The Court has never gone so far,18
 
 12. FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23 (1998). 
 but it has held that standing 
 13. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562 (citing Allen, 468 U.S. at 758). 
 14. See, e.g., id. at 577 (“To permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public 
interest in executive officers’ compliance with the law into an ‘individual right’ vindicable in 
the courts is to permit Congress to transfer from the President to the courts the Chief 
Executive’s most important constitutional duty, to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed.’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3)); Allen, 468 U.S. at 761 (“The 
Constitution . . . assigns to the Executive Branch, and not to the Judicial Branch, the duty to 
‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3)); Edward 
A. Hartnett, The Standing of the United States:  How Criminal Prosecutions Show that 
Standing Doctrine Is Looking for Answers in All the Wrong Places, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2239, 
2256 (1999) (arguing that the question of “[w]ho can constitutionally be empowered to 
represent . . . public interests in court” is a question “of the proper interpretation, not of 
Article III or Article I, but of Article II.”); Harold J. Krent & Ethan G. Shenkman, Of Citizen 
Suits and Citizen Sunstein, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1793, 1793–96, 1804–08 (1993) (arguing that 
Article II requires presidential control of law enforcement activities, and bars suits against 
the federal government by individuals who lack an “individuated interest”); see also Steven 
G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution:  Unitary Executive, Plural 
Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1215 (1992). 
 15. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.  
 16. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 17. See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute 
the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 595 (1994) (“[A]ll ‘executive power’ found in the Constitution 
is only vested in one individual, the President.  If anyone else is ever to exercise federal 
executive power, it must be as a result of the explicit or tacit delegation and approval of the 
President . . . .”); Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 14, at 1165, 1215 (arguing that “[t]he text 
and structure of Article II compel the conclusion that the President retains supervisory 
control over all officers exercising executive power”); see also Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting 
the Unitary Executive:  Congressional Delegations of Administrative Authority Outside the 
Federal Government, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 62, 72–80 (1990); Lee S. Liberman, Morrison v. 
Olson:  A Formalistic Perspective on Why the Court Was Wrong, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 313, 
316, 347–54 (1989).  This “unitary executive” view of Article II has inspired significant 
criticism, on both doctrinal and historical grounds. See, e.g., Morton Rosenberg, Congress’s 
Prerogative over Agencies and Agency Decisionmakers:  The Rise and Demise of the 
Reagan Administration’s Theory of the Unitary Executive, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 627, 634 
(1989); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government:  Separation of Powers and 
the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 609–50 (1984) (criticizing the unitary executive 
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doctrine functions, in part, to protect executive power by limiting the 
enforcement of federal law by litigants not subject to the control of the 
President.19  Tara Grove has recently offered an insightful alternative 
account of the Article II basis for standing doctrine, arguing that standing 
protects individual liberty against arbitrary and unchecked exercises of 
prosecutorial discretion by private actors.20  Despite their differences, all of 
the Article II theories of standing share—with one another and with Article 
III treatments of standing doctrine—a focus on the standing of plaintiffs.21
B.  Legislative Standing 
 
The Court has developed a specialized set of standing rules to govern 
cases in which a legislator seeks either to assert or to defend claims 
addressing either the constitutionality of a law or the legality of executive 
action.  Given the frequency with which legislators seek to intervene in 
public law cases, the rules governing legislative standing are especially 
significant in assessing the standing of intervenor-defendants.  The 
 
theory on historical grounds); id. at 583–86 (criticizing it on structural and doctrinal 
grounds); Cass R. Sunstein, Article II Revisionism, 92 MICH. L. REV. 131, 137–38 (1993); 
Sunstein, supra note 11, at 211–14. 
 18. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 690 n.29 (1987) (rejecting the dissent’s 
unitary executive theory as requiring “an extrapolation from general constitutional language 
which we think is more than the text will bear”); see also Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 
14, at 1208 (noting that in Morrison, “seven Justices rejected Chief Justice Taft’s and Justice 
Scalia’s unitary executive construction of Article II”).  
 19. See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577 (discussing the role of standing doctrine in 
protecting executive power from usurpation by Congress and the judiciary); see also Allen v. 
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). 
 20. See Tara Leigh Grove, Standing as an Article II Nondelegation Doctrine, 11 U. 
PENN. J. CONST. L. 781, 801–03 (2009); see also Jason Lynch, Federalism, Separation of 
Powers, and the Role of State Attorneys General in Multistate Litigation, 101 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1998, 2029 (2001) (“Instances of the execution of federal law by those outside the 
direct control of the President—such as citizens’ suit provisions in federal statutes and state 
implementation of federal regulatory standards—have touched off a vigorous judicial and 
academic debate.”); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 
1367, 1445 (2003) (“Private delegates’ exemption from constitutional constraints means that 
they can wield these government powers in ways that raise serious abuse of power 
concerns.”); Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 
102 MICH. L. REV. 689, 731 (2004) (discussing qui tam actions, and noting “obvious dangers 
in a system that permits prosecutorial discretion to reside in each of 250 million autonomous 
decisionmakers”). 
 21. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary 
Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 55–57 (1995) (describing limitations on “standing to sue” as 
a device to protect the Executive Branch from usurpation of power by the judiciary, 
Congress, and lawyers representing private plaintiffs); Grove, supra note 20, at 789 (stating 
that the focus in Article II standing inquiry “should not be on the Executive Branch, but on 
the private plaintiff”) (emphasis added); see also infra Part II.B. 
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foundational cases in this area are Coleman v. Miller22 and Raines v. 
Byrd.23
In Coleman, a group of Kansas state legislators challenged the state 
legislature’s ratification of the proposed Child Labor Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.
 
24  The state Senate had deadlocked on the 
amendment, and the Lieutenant Governor, as presiding officer, cast a tie-
breaking vote in favor of ratification.25  The claim of the objecting state 
legislators rested on the argument that the Lieutenant Governor did not have 
the power to break a tie in relation to proposed federal constitutional 
amendments.26  The Court found that the objectors had standing, noting that 
their “votes against ratification have been overridden and virtually held for 
naught[,] although if they are right in their contentions their votes would 
have been sufficient to defeat ratification.”27  The Court held that these 
allegations established “a plain, direct and adequate interest in maintaining 
the effectiveness of their votes.”28  Importantly, the Court contrasted this 
basis for standing with the right of every citizen “‘to require that the 
Government be administered according to law,’” which did not entitle 
private citizens to sue.29
Fifty-eight years later, the Court refined the rule of Coleman in Raines v. 
Byrd.  In that case, several federal legislators brought an action in which 
they asked the Court to invalidate the Line Item Veto Act of 1996,
 
30 
claiming that the Act violated the grant of legislative power to Congress by 
permitting the President effectively to amend spending laws by removing 
particular appropriations enacted by Congress.31  The Court, with Chief 
Justice Rehnquist writing, held that the plaintiffs lacked “a sufficient 
‘personal stake’” in the dispute, and had neither suffered a concrete 
personal injury, nor a cognizable institutional injury.32
The Court first held that the plaintiffs had not adequately alleged a 
personal injury.  Rather, they had alleged an institutional injury to the 
power of Congress to craft legislation.
 
33  “Their claim is that the Act causes 
a type of institutional injury . . . which necessarily damages all Members of 
Congress and both Houses of Congress equally.”34
 
 22. 307 U.S. 433 (1939). 
  The Court thus 
distinguished Raines from an earlier case, Powell v. McCormack, in which 
 23. 521 U.S. 811 (1997). 
 24. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 435–36. 
 25. Id. at 436. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 438. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 440 (quoting Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129 (1922)). 
 30. 2 U.S.C. § 691 (1996). 
 31. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 816 (1997).  The plaintiffs were eventually proved 
right on the merits, when the Court invalidated the Act the following year. See Clinton v. 
City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998). 
 32. Raines, 521 U.S. at 830. 
 33. Id. at 825. 
 34. Id. at 821. 
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standing had been premised on Congressman Adam Clayton Powell’s 
allegation that he had been “singled out for specially unfavorable treatment” 
by other members of Congress, who had refused to seat him after his 
election.35
Next, the Court held that the Raines plaintiffs, unlike the plaintiffs in 
Coleman, could not establish standing based on an institutional injury.  
Coleman stood “for the proposition that legislators whose votes would have 
been sufficient to defeat (or enact) a specific legislative Act have standing 
to sue if that legislative action goes into effect (or does not go into effect), 
on the ground that their votes have been completely nullified.”
 
36  Raines 
was different, the Court held, because the plaintiffs had not alleged “that 
they voted for a specific bill, that there were sufficient votes to pass the bill, 
and that the bill was nonetheless deemed defeated.”37  Thus, under Raines, 
legislative standing would seem to exist only when a specific legislative 
vote is “completely nullified,”38 as when a legislative act goes into effect 
(or does not go into effect) despite the legislator-plaintiff having cast a vote 
that was “sufficient to defeat (or enact)” the act.39
Finally, Justice Souter, in his concurrence, explained the Court’s narrow 
view of legislative standing by reference to foundational separation-of-
powers concerns.  He suggested that disputes of the sort at issue in Raines 
were better suited to resolution by the political branches, in part because of 
the risk to the Court’s reputation if it were perceived as taking sides in a 
dispute between the President and Congress.
 
40  Raines thus represents the 
triumph of a view that Justice Scalia had been articulating for many years:  
that because legislative standing cases tend to involve “purely 
intragovernmental dispute[s] . . . concerning the proper workings of [the 
political branches] under the Constitution,”41 judicial intervention in such 
disputes poses unacceptably serious threats to the legitimacy of the Court.42
Proponents of a strong view of legislative standing often cite a passage in 
INS v. Chadha in which the Supreme Court stated:  “We have long held that 
  
 
 35. Id. (discussing Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969)). 
 36. Id. at 823. 
 37. Id. at 824. 
 38. Id. at 823. 
 39. Id.; see also Anthony Clark Arend & Catherine B. Lotrionte, Congress Goes to 
Court:  The Past, Present, and Future of Legislator Standing, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
209, 258 (2001); Weiner, supra note 11, at 206. 
 40. Raines, 521 U.S. at 833 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 41. Moore v. U.S. House of Reps., 733 F.2d 946, 957 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
 42. Id.  As Justice Scalia observed while still serving on the D.C. Circuit, a legislative 
suit is not 
between two individuals regarding action taken by them in their private capacities; 
nor a suit between an individual and an officer of one or another Branch of 
government regarding the effect of a governmental act or decree upon the 
individual’s private activities.  It is a purely intragovernmental 
dispute . . . concerning the proper workings of the Legislative Branch under the 
Constitution. 
Id. 
1548 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
 
Congress is the proper party to defend the validity of a statute when an 
agency of government, as a defendant charged with enforcing the statute, 
agrees with plaintiffs that the statute is inapplicable or unconstitutional.”43
In Chadha, a federal statutory provision that authorized either house of 
Congress, by resolution of that house alone, to invalidate a decision by the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to allow a particular 
deportable alien to remain in the United States was challenged as a 
violation of the separation of powers doctrine.  The INS—represented by 
the U.S. Attorney General—agreed with the petitioner alien’s claim that the 
legislative veto provision was unconstitutional, and the Ninth Circuit 
permitted Congress to intervene to defend the challenged statute.
  
Taken out of context, that statement would appear to permit congressional 
intervention in any case in which the Attorney General declines to defend 
the constitutionality of a federal statute.  But the Court has interpreted 
Chadha far more narrowly. 
44
Chadha thus involved a peculiar kind of statute—one that granted each 
house of Congress the power to veto certain decisions of the Executive 
Branch
  The 
Court permitted the intervention, and struck down the statute as a violation 
of separation of powers. 
45—and its holding regarding legislative standing has never been 
extended beyond that narrow context.  Indeed, the Court has since rejected 
efforts to expand Chadha’s recognition of legislative standing to permit 
intervention in any case involving Congress’s power vis-à-vis the President.  
Denying legislative standing in Raines v. Byrd, the Court held that the 
institutional injury to Congress effected by the Line Item Veto Act was 
“wholly abstract and widely dispersed,” and thus could not support a claim 
of institutional injury.46  The same might be said of Congress’s interest in 
defending the Defense of Marriage Act.  The Court in Raines went on to 
distinguish Chadha, noting that—under the broad view of that case urged 
by the intervenors in Raines—any federal official would have standing to 
challenge any law that reduced his or her authority relative to another 
branch.47  Although “[t]here would be nothing irrational about [such] a 
system,” the Court said, “it is obviously not the regime that has obtained 
under our Constitution to date.”48  The federal judicial power does not 
include “some amorphous general supervision of the operations of 
government.”49
 
 43. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 939 (1983). 
  
 44. Id. at 923–28. 
 45. Id. at 923–25. 
 46. 521 U.S. 811, 829 (1997); see also id. at 826 (“There is a vast difference between the 
level of vote nullification at issue in Coleman and the abstract dilution of institutional 
legislative power that is alleged here.  To uphold standing here would require a drastic 
extension of Coleman.  We are unwilling to take that step.”). 
 47. Id. at 828. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 829 (quoting United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192 (1974) (Powell, 
J., concurring)). 
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Chadha, in short, held only that Congress has a sufficient institutional 
stake to support a case or controversy where it seeks to defend a power 
granted to it by a statute.  Chadha does not hold that Congress may 
intervene to defend any challenged federal statute, and such a holding 
would be irreconcilable with Raines, not to mention flatly at odds with the 
exclusive grant of power to the Attorney General in 28 U.S.C. § 516.50
C.  Legislative Power to Confer Standing 
 
The personal stake necessary to create an Article III case or controversy 
may be created by legislative action.  That is, either federal or state 
lawmakers may create new rights and, to some extent, confer standing to 
enforce them.  Most obviously, state or federal law can create a “right,” the 
violation of which constitutes an Article III injury.51  When Congress 
passed Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,52 for example, large numbers 
of private plaintiffs were thereby granted standing to bring federal suits 
alleging violations of their newly created statutory rights.  Congress also 
may, by statute, override prudential aspects of standing law, such as the 
third-party standing doctrine.53
This legislative power to create standing is not without limits, however.  
The Court has often held that Congress may not ignore or override 
constitutional standing constraints by, for instance, granting a right to sue to 
someone who lacks a personal, concrete, and particularized injury.
 
54  “It is 
settled that Congress cannot erase Article III’s standing requirements by 
statutorily granting the right to sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise 
have standing.”55
Whether the courts were to act on their own, or at the invitation of 
Congress, in ignoring the concrete injury requirement described in 
  The Court has reasoned that this limit is an essential 
bulwark of the separation of powers, stating: 
 
 50. See 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2006) (“Except as otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of 
litigation in which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party, or is interested, 
and securing evidence therefor, is reserved to officers of the Department of Justice, under the 
direction of the Attorney General.”). 
 51. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (“The actual or threatened injury 
required by Art. III may exist solely by virtue of ‘statutes creating legal rights, the invasion 
of which creates standing.’”); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973) 
(“Congress may enact statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing, 
even though no injury would exist without the statute.”); FMC Corp. v. Boesky, 852 F.2d 
981, 993 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Properly pleaded violations of state-created legal rights, therefore, 
must suffice to satisfy Article III’s injury requirement.”); see also Gene R. Nichol, Jr., 
Justice Scalia, Standing, and Public Law Litigation, 42 DUKE L.J. 1141, 1146 (1993); 
Michael E. Rosman, Standing Alone:  Standing Under the Fair Housing Act, 60 MO. L. REV. 
547, 556–67 (1995). 
 52. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701–18, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2006). 
 53. Warth, 422 U.S. at 501 (“Congress may grant an express right of action to persons 
who otherwise would be barred by prudential standing rules.”). 
 54. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573 (1992); Gladstone, Realtors v. 
Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979) (“In no event, however, may Congress abrogate 
the Art. III minima . . . .”); Nichol, supra note 51, at 1146. 
 55. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 n.3 (1997). 
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our cases, they would be discarding a principle fundamental to the 
separate and distinct constitutional role of the Third Branch—one 
of the essential elements that identifies those “Cases” and 
“Controversies” that are the business of the courts rather than of 
the political branches.56
II.  THE PROBLEM OF STANDING TO DEFEND 
 
Judicial57 and scholarly58
This part critiques the common understanding of Article III standing 
requirements as applicable only or primarily to plaintiffs, and demonstrates 
that Article III’s Cases or Controversies Clause requires that defendants, as 
well as plaintiffs, possess a personal stake in the outcome of the litigation.  
It then uses ongoing federal litigation concerning the constitutionality of the 
federal Defense of Marriage Act and California’s Proposition 8 to illustrate 
that the application of standing requirements to defendants may have 
significant consequences in public law litigation. 
 descriptions of standing typically focus on the 
requirements that Article III imposes on plaintiffs.  Although the Supreme 
Court has also examined the defendant’s personal stake in determining 
whether Article III jurisdiction exists, it has not articulated a coherent 
theory to guide lower courts.  As a result, few lower courts or scholars have 
considered the other side of the standing coin—the degree to which Article 
III requires defendants to possess a personal stake in the outcome of the 
litigation. 
A.  The Article III Requirement of Defendant Standing 
The widespread acceptance of a largely one-sided view of Article III 
standing—as limiting who may sue but not who may defend—is surprising 
because both the text of Article III and the Court’s case law interpreting it 
strongly support the argument that a defendant’s personal stake is a 
necessary component of an Article III case or controversy.  First, as a 
textual matter, the Cases or Controversies Clause seems plainly to require 
 
 56. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576. 
 57. See, e.g., Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1442 (2011) 
(“To state a case or controversy under Article III, a plaintiff must establish standing.”); 
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (describing standing as “an indispensable part of the plaintiff’s 
case”); Warth, 422 U.S. at 498 (“[T]he standing question is whether the plaintiff has ‘alleged 
such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy’ as to warrant his invocation of 
federal-court jurisdiction.”). 
 58. See, e.g., 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531, at 32 (3d ed. 2008) (“Many opinions refer to 
‘standing’ in more general terms as a means of deciding whether the plaintiff has the claim 
or right asserted.”); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.3.1 (5th ed. 2007); 
John G. Roberts, Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 DUKE L.J. 1219, 1220 
(1993) (“One way federal courts ensure that they have a ‘real, earnest, and vital controversy’ 
before them is by testing the plaintiff’s standing to bring suit.”); Antonin Scalia, The 
Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 881, 885 (1983) (“Standing requires . . . the allegation of some particularized injury to 
the individual plaintiff.”). 
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interested parties on both sides of the case.  A one-sided “case” or 
“controversy” is an oxymoron.  Second, the few cases in which the Court 
has considered the relevance of a defendant’s personal stake to federal 
jurisdiction confirm that Article III requires defendants to possess a 
personal stake in the outcome.  The failure of lower courts to honor this 
principle—or even to acknowledge it—is thus perplexing. 
1.  A “Case” or “Controversy” Requires Interested Adversaries 
The terms “case” and “controversy,” in their nature, presuppose a dispute 
with interested parties on both sides;59 indeed, it makes little sense even to 
speak of a case or a controversy with only one interested party.60  In light of 
this textual reality, it is not surprising that the Court has frequently 
explained the restrictions imposed by the Cases or Controversies Clause in 
terms of limiting federal courts to deciding “questions presented in an 
adversary context,”61 a phrase that suggests that both sides to a dispute 
must possess an interest in the outcome.  By imposing this requirement, 
Article III ensures that the federal courts resolve only legal questions that 
“emerge[] precisely framed and necessary for decision from a clash of 
adversary argument . . . embracing conflicting and demanding interests.”62
2.  The Defendant Standing Requirement Hides in Plain Sight 
 
If the Cases or Controversies Clause requires that defendants, as well as 
plaintiffs, possess a personal stake in the matter, one might reasonably 
wonder why defendant standing has received so little attention, and why it 
is so rarely litigated.  The answer is simple:  doubts about a defendant’s 
standing arise infrequently, because in the vast majority of cases, the 
defendant’s standing is apparent.  Any defendant against whom relief is 
sought will always have standing to defend, because the exposure to risk of 
 
 59. See, e.g., Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997) 
(“Standing to defend on appeal in the place of an original defendant, no less than standing to 
sue, demands that the litigant possess ‘a direct stake in the outcome.’” (quoting Diamond v. 
Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 62 (1986))); Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895) (dismissing 
where there was “no actual controversy involving real and substantial rights between the 
parties to the record”). 
 60. See United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302 (1943) (dismissing where parties did not 
appear genuinely adverse); Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 129, 134–35 (1873) 
(dismissing where the parties colluded to bring the case “for the purpose of obtaining the 
opinion of th[e] court on important constitutional questions without the actual existence of 
the facts on which such questions can alone arise”); cf. Lord v. Veazie, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 
251, 255 (1850) (holding that “any attempt, by a mere colorable dispute, to obtain the 
opinion of the court upon a question of law which a party desires to know for his own 
interest or his own purposes, when there is no real and substantial controversy between those 
who appear as adverse parties to the suit, is an abuse which courts of justice have always 
reprehended, and treated as a punishable contempt of court”). 
 61. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968); see also, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 
204 (1962) (standing ensures “concrete adverseness”). 
 62. Flast, 392 U.S. at 96–97 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Freuhauf, 365 
U.S. 146, 157 (1961)). 
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injury from an adverse judgment is a sufficient personal stake to satisfy 
Article III.63  This is so because the Court has recognized that the imminent 
threat of injury is sufficient to create an Article III case or controversy.64
Because the defendant standing requirement is nearly always satisfied, 
the issue does not arise in the typical case and is thus easily overlooked.  It 
becomes an issue only in the rare case involving a would-be defendant as to 
whom the plaintiff has sought no relief.  Typically, such would-be 
defendants are intervenors who seek court permission to join the case as 
parties to oppose the relief the plaintiff seeks.  Not infrequently, then, 
defendant standing becomes an issue in public law cases when the named 
defendant (often a state or federal official) refuses to defend all or part of a 
plaintiff’s claim, and a third party seeks to intervene as a defendant—for 
example, to urge continued application of a purportedly unconstitutional 
statute.
 
65
3.  The Court Frequently Requires Defendants to Establish a Personal Stake 
 
In those few cases in which the defendant’s standing seems questionable, 
the Court has frequently based determinations of its own jurisdiction on 
findings about whether the defendant’s personal stake was sufficient to 
establish an Article III case or controversy.  The Court has, for instance, 
frequently premised a finding of jurisdiction (or the lack thereof) on facts 
concerning the defendant’s stake in the litigation, hinting at a symmetrical 
understanding of Article III standing—an interpretation of the Cases or 
Controversies Clause as requiring both plaintiffs and defendants to possess 
a sufficient personal stake in the outcome.  In so doing, the Court has, in 
effect, recognized that Article III standing requirements apply no less to 
defendants than to plaintiffs, and has held that they apply both in the trial 
court and on appeal.66  In short, “[s]tanding to sue or defend is an aspect of 
the case-or-controversy requirement.”67
 
 63. Steinman, supra note 
 
6, at 831.  Indeed, the right to defend when faced with a 
possible deprivation is a component of due process. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 
254, 271 (1970).  This right to be heard in one’s own defense is necessarily a sufficient 
personal stake to create an Article III case or controversy. 
 64. See, e.g., MedImmune, Inc., v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 126–27 (2007) 
(clarifying the compatibility of declaratory judgment actions with the Article III case or 
controversy requirement); Nashville, Chattanooga, & St. Louis Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 
249, 264 (1933) (holding that declaratory judgment proceeding was justiciable “so long as 
the case retains the essentials of an adversary proceeding, involving a real, not a 
hypothetical, controversy”). 
 65. See infra Part II.C (discussing examples). 
 66. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997); see also 
ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 618–21 (1989) (finding jurisdiction based on 
defendant’s demonstrated personal stake); Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 62 (1986) 
(denying standing to an intervenor-defendant, but holding that if the original defendant, the 
State of Illinois, had appealed, “the ‘case’ or ‘controversy’ requirement would be met, for a 
State has standing to defend the constitutionality of its statute”) (emphasis added). 
 67. Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 64 (emphasis added); see also Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95, 
102–04 (1989) (recognizing defendants’ standing to appeal in state court declaratory 
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At the same time, the Court’s treatment of these issues has been 
inconsistent, due in part to the lack of a clear theoretical framework.  In 
some cases, the Court has enforced something that looks like a defendant-
standing requirement, but has done so using the rubrics of causation and 
redressability—doctrines which are typically associated with plaintiff’s 
standing.  In other cases, the Court has skipped over these matters 
altogether.  The Court’s own confusion has left the lower courts with no 
map to follow, thus generating predictably inconsistent results. 
In a number of cases, the Court has dismissed the action for lack of 
Article III jurisdiction because the defendant lacked a sufficient personal 
stake.68  In Diamond v. Charles,69 for instance, the Court considered the 
standing of an intervenor-defendant who sought to appeal the district 
court’s determination that an Illinois law restricting abortion was 
unconstitutional.70  The appellant, Eugene Diamond, was a pediatrician in 
private practice in Illinois, who had successfully intervened in the district 
court to defend the law alongside the state-official defendants.71  After the 
district court invalidated the law, the state declined to appeal.  Diamond 
then sought to appeal alone.72  The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for 
lack of jurisdiction, stating that Diamond lacked the personal stake required 
by Article III.73
In reaching this decision, the Court first held that the state’s failure to 
appeal ended the case or controversy between the original parties, and thus 
required Diamond to establish standing in his own right to sustain federal 
jurisdiction under Article III.
 
74  Next, the Court rejected Diamond’s various 
efforts to establish a personal stake—as a doctor, a citizen, and a father—
noting that, on the facts of the case, none of Diamond’s proffered bases for 
standing sufficed to create the requisite legally cognizable interest.75
In other cases, the Court has done the opposite, holding federal 
jurisdiction proper based on its finding that the defendant’s stake in the 
outcome was sufficient to create an Article III case or controversy.
  
Because no defendant with standing had sought review, the Court dismissed 
the appeal on jurisdictional grounds. 
76
 
judgment action); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 257 (1953) (addressing the standing of 
appellee to defend the judgment below). 
  In 
 68. See, e.g., Diamond, 476 U.S. at 69. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 56. 
 71. Id. at 57–58. 
 72. Id. at 61. 
 73. Id. at 69. 
 74. Id. at 68. 
 75. Id. at 68–70. 
 76. See, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 288–89 (2000) (finding 
jurisdiction based on defendant-appellant’s personal stake in the case, despite mootness of 
plaintiff’s claim); ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 618 (1989) (on appeal from state 
supreme court, finding jurisdiction based on defendant-appellant’s personal stake in the case 
although plaintiff lacked standing under federal standards).  
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ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish,77 for instance, individual state taxpayers, together 
with an association of schoolteachers, challenged an Arizona statute 
governing mineral leases as void under federal law.78  The Arizona 
Supreme Court found the statute invalid, and the Supreme Court affirmed.79  
Before reaching the merits, the Court addressed the question of standing, 
and acknowledged that, under federal standing rules, the plaintiffs would 
have lacked standing to commence their action in federal court.80  The 
Court held, however, that this was not fatal to its appellate jurisdiction.  
Although the case did not present a “case or controversy” at the outset (on 
account of the plaintiff’s lack of standing) it had been transformed into a 
“case or controversy” by virtue of the state court judgment against the 
defendant.  Being subjected to such a judgment “constitutes the kind of 
injury cognizable in this Court on review from the state courts.  
[Defendants] are faced with ‘actual or threatened injury’ that is sufficiently 
‘distinct and palpable’ to support their standing to invoke the authority of a 
federal court.”81  Thus, the defendant’s injury from the state court judgment 
was sufficient to support a case or controversy.  Although the plaintiff 
lacked standing under federal justiciability law to complain initially about 
the defendant’s conduct, the Court assessed its own appellate jurisdiction in 
light of the injury imposed on the defendants by the state court 
adjudication.82
The Court offered two key rationales for its holding.  First, it emphasized 
that the functions served by justiciability doctrines—ensuring the 
presentation of issues in a concrete factual setting, between adverse and 
properly motivated parties—were met.
 
83  Second, the Court opined that, 
because state courts are free to hear cases that do not meet federal 
justiciability requirements, to hold that there was no case or controversy 
would effectively render some state court adjudications of federal law 
unreviewable—a result the Court found unacceptable.84
 
 77. 490 U.S. 605 (1989). 
  The Court might 
have addressed this problem by simply vacating the state court judgment on 
jurisdictional grounds.  It was unwilling to do so, however, because that 
 78. Id. at 610. 
 79. Id. at 610, 633. 
 80. Id. at 612–17.  Justice Kennedy’s opinion stated that, even assuming that the 
plaintiffs proved that the statute had cost the state millions of dollars that would otherwise 
have been directed to schools, it was “pure speculation” whether a judgment in the plaintiffs’ 
favor would result in either lower taxes for the taxpayer plaintiffs or increased school 
spending and compensation for the teacher’s association plaintiffs. Id. at 614.  On this point, 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion garnered four votes; the other four participating Justices saw no 
reason to reach this issue. Id. at 609; id. at 633–34 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 81. Id. at 618 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 
490, 500–01 (1975)). 
 82. Id. at 618–20.  The Court also recognized the plaintiff’s right to defend on appeal the 
judgment obtained below. Id. 
 83. Id. at 619. 
 84. Id. at 620–22. 
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would effectively have imposed federal standing requirements on state 
courts.85
After ASARCO, the Court applied a similar rationale to find defendant 
standing to appeal, despite the mootness of the plaintiff’s claim, where the 
defendant’s own personal stake was deemed sufficient to create a case or 
controversy.  It is black letter law that a case or controversy must exist at all 
stages of federal judicial review.
 
86  Thus, when a plaintiff’s claim becomes 
moot while the case is pending on appeal, federal courts ordinarily dismiss 
the action, and vacate the judgment below for lack of jurisdiction.87  But 
that option is not available for state court litigation of federal questions that 
becomes moot pending appeal to the Supreme Court.  Because state courts 
are free to apply their own versions of mootness and standing doctrines, the 
Supreme Court will not vacate a state court judgment in a case that was 
justiciable under state law.88
The key case is City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M.
  Again, the governing principle is that the 
Supreme Court cannot foist federal jurisdictional rules onto state courts. 
89  There, the Court held that it 
may exercise appellate jurisdiction in an otherwise moot lawsuit where the 
plaintiff prevailed below, because the state court judgment creates an injury 
to the defendant sufficient to create an Article III case or controversy.  In 
Pap’s A.M., the plaintiff, an operator of a nude dancing establishment, sued 
Erie, Pennsylvania seeking an injunction barring the enforcement against 
exotic dancers of an ordinance that banned public nudity.90  The state trial 
court granted the injunction on federal constitutional grounds, and the state 
supreme court affirmed that decision.91  While the City’s petition for 
certiorari was pending, the seventy-two-year-old man who owned the 
plaintiff corporation chose to retire.  He thereafter submitted a sworn 
declaration stating that he had exited the adult entertainment business and 
retired permanently, had closed the dancing club that was the subject of the 
litigation, and even sold the real estate on which it was located.  He 
therefore moved to dismiss the case as moot.92
 
 85. Id. at 620–21. 
 
 86. See Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990) (holding that “the case-
or-controversy requirement subsists through all stages of federal judicial proceedings, trial 
and appellate”); see also FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 461 (2007) (arguing 
that “[i]t is not enough that a dispute was very much alive when the suit was filed,” but case 
or controversy requirements must exist at all stages of federal judicial review (quoting Lewis, 
494 U.S. at 477)). 
 87. See United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39 (1950) (“The established 
practice of the Court in dealing with a civil case . . . which has become moot . . . is to reverse 
or vacate the judgment below and remand with a direction to dismiss.”). 
 88. See, e.g., ASARCO, 490 U.S. at 620–21 (noting that the Court cannot properly vacate 
a state court judgment on a question of federal law based on non-justiciability under federal 
standards); Kan. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Corp. Comm’n of Kan., 481 U.S. 1044 (1987) 
(dismissing the case for lack of case or controversy, but leaving the state judgment intact). 
 89. 529 U.S. 277 (2000). 
 90. Id. at 284. 
 91. Id. at 284–86. 
 92. Id. at 287–89. 
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The Court denied the motion, found the case not moot, and reversed on 
the merits.  The Court described the mootness issue as a “close” one, but 
refused to dismiss on justiciability grounds because the City (the defendant 
below) was suffering harm in the form of the state court’s order invalidating 
its public nudity ordinance.93  Thus, despite the apparent lack of a personal 
stake on plaintiff’s part, the Court found defendant’s injury from the 
judgment below sufficient in itself to establish federal jurisdiction.  
Concurring in part, Justice Scalia referred to this part of the Court’s 
rationale as “the neat trick of identifying a ‘case or controversy’ that has 
only one interested party.”94
Most recently, in McConnell v. FEC,
 
95 the Court again recognized the 
critical role of defendant’s personal stake in establishing a case or 
controversy.  In McConnell, the plaintiff argued that the intervenor-
defendant’s appeal should be dismissed because the intervenor-defendant 
lacked standing.  The Court rejected this argument not on the theory that the 
intervenor-defendants need not have standing, but instead because a 
different defendant had standing sufficient to establish a federal case or 
controversy.96  In other words, the Court identified a case or controversy 
sufficient to support federal jurisdiction based on its determination that the 
named defendant, the Federal Election Commission, clearly had standing.97  
Then, having determined that there was a case or controversy based on the 
personal stake of the original defendant, the Court permitted the intervenor 
to piggyback on the existing dispute.98
In all of these cases, the Court has held that the existence of a case or 
controversy—and thus the propriety of federal jurisdiction—depends on 
whether a defendant has a personal stake in the outcome.  And yet, because 
such cases are relatively rare, the lesson has been lost both on courts and on 
most scholars. 
 
B.  The Persistent Misunderstanding of Defendant Standing 
Notwithstanding the Court’s repeated application of Article III 
limitations on standing to defend, lower courts have, for the most part, not 
recognized defendant standing as a distinct component of Article III’s Cases 
or Controversies Clause.99
 
 93. Id. at 288–89.  The Court also suggested that despite plaintiff’s declaration, Pap’s 
could conceivably resume its nude dancing operations at some point in the future. Id. at 288. 
  This subpart illustrates the plaintiff-centered 
 94. Id. at 307 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 95. 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 
(2010). 
 96. Id. at 233. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. This may be partly explained by the rarity with which the issue comes up.  As 
discussed in Part II.A.2, supra, the issue will rarely come up with respect to named 
defendants, unless the plaintiff simply names the wrong defendant.  But when it does arise in 
the trial court—most commonly with respect to intervenors—courts struggle due to the 
absence of a clear and coherent doctrine. 
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model of standing that prevails in lower federal courts, and demonstrates 
that courts often conceal their consideration of defendant standing in the 
guise of plaintiff standing. 
When standing questions arise at the trial court level, courts focus their 
analysis “almost invariably on the plaintiff.”100  If the defendant enters into 
the standing discussion at all, it is typically only in the context of the 
“causation” and “redressability” of the plaintiff’s injury.101  Thus, to the 
extent they recognize the personal stake of the defendant as relevant to 
Article III jurisdiction, courts typically have sought to force it into the 
familiar categories of plaintiff standing, rather than recognizing defendant 
standing as a distinct consideration.102  Indeed, some courts have even gone 
so far as to deny that Article III standing limitations apply to defendants at 
all.103  Only a very few lower court opinions have recognized the necessity 
of a defendant’s stake in the outcome to the creation of an Article III case or 
controversy.104
Scholars of standing have done little to sort through this confusion.  The 
vast literature on Article III standing doctrine has focused almost uniformly 
on plaintiff standing.
 
105
 
  Courts have been quicker to recognize that Article III may apply directly to the 
defendant on appeal.  The Supreme Court has held that where an intervenor seeks to appeal 
an adverse judgment that the original defendant has not appealed, “[s]tanding to defend on 
appeal in the place of an original defendant, no less than standing to sue, demands that the 
litigant possess ‘a direct stake in the outcome.’” Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 
520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997) (quoting Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 62 (1986)). 
  No scholar has mounted a sustained defense of the 
proposition that Article III requires defendants, as much as plaintiffs, to 
possess a personal stake in the outcome of the litigation.  Indeed, when the 
term “defendant standing” appears, it is typically used to refer to limits, not 
 100. 13A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 58, § 3531, at 4. 
 101. Id. at 5–6. 
 102. Id. § 3531.5, at 296; see also,e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 
180 n.64 (1996) (noting that the lack of a proper defendant will lead to dismissal on plaintiff 
standing grounds, based on lack of redressability); Hall v. LHACO, Inc. 140 F.3d 1190, 
1193, 1196–97 (8th Cir. 1998) (denying standing based on a finding that the wrong party had 
been sued). 
 103. See, e.g., Colo. ex rel. Simpson v. Highland Irrigation Co., 893 P.2d 122, 126–28 
(Colo. 1995); see also 13A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 58, § 3531, at 5–6.  This 
Article is concerned primarily with civil litigation.  The term “standing” may also be used in 
the criminal context, where courts commonly consider the standing of a defendant to raise 
certain arguments. See, e.g., Dowtin v. United States, 999 A.2d 903, 908 (D.C. 2010) 
(holding that a defendant lacked “standing” to challenge an alleged violation of his co-
defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights).  In that context, the question of standing is not 
concerned with who may defend, but with the scope of arguments that the named defendant 
may raise. 
 104. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., v. Jamison, 787 F. Supp. 231, 235 n.1 
(D.D.C. 1990) (noting that Article III jurisdiction of federal courts may turn on “questions 
related to whether the defendant has a sufficient interest to present a justiciable controversy 
with the plaintiff”). 
 105. Hundreds of law review articles have addressed plaintiff standing; only one that I am 
aware of has argued that a defendant’s personal stake is essential to the existence of a case or 
controversy. See Steinman, supra note 6, at 831–34 (discussing the importance of the right to 
defend and the nature of the personal stake that a party (plaintiff or defendant) must show to 
establish standing to appeal). 
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on who may defend, but only on the scope of arguments that a defendant 
may raise.106  Some scholars have simply recited the common judicial view 
that the defendant’s personal stake goes only to the issue of the plaintiff’s 
standing, by casting light on causation and redressability.107
Quite apart from what the Cases or Controversies Clause may permit, 
there are compelling policy reasons not to allow just anyone to defend a 
litigation matter.
 
108  And federal courts have restricted defendant standing, 
to a degree.  But they frequently have done so by stretching aspects of the 
plaintiff standing doctrine—namely, causation and redressability109
The Court has long held that federal courts lack jurisdiction over cases in 
which, even though the plaintiff has shown an injury in fact, the named 
defendant did not cause that injury, or the injury cannot be redressed by a 
court order.
—
beyond their intended application to do the work of ensuring that 
defendants have the requisite personal stake in the controversy. 
110  The earliest cases applying these doctrines used them to 
reject plaintiff standing when the prospect of benefit accruing to the 
plaintiff from the litigation was too speculative, because it depended on the 
actions of unrelated third parties not before the court.111  In Warth v. Seldin, 
for example, the Court dismissed an action against city officials brought by 
plaintiffs who were seeking the construction of low income housing.112
 
 106. The Hart & Wechsler Federal Courts casebook, for instance, contains a thirteen-page 
section addressing defendant standing that contains no discussion at all of any Article III 
limits on who may defend a claim.  Instead, the authors focus entirely on jus tertii, 
overbreadth, and other doctrines limiting the scope of arguments that a particular defendant 
may raise. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 153–65 (6th ed. 2009). 
  It 
reasoned that causation and redressability were absent because no evidence 
suggested the readiness of private developers to proceed even if the court 
 107. See, e.g., Heather Elliott, Congress’s Inability to Solve Standing Problems, 91 B.U. 
L. REV. 159, 168, 179 (2011); Sunstein, supra note 11, at 193–95; Woolhandler & Nelson, 
supra note 20, at 722–23 (“[T]he lack of a proper defendant . . . is normally thought of as a 
standing issue, currently embodied in the requirements of causation and redressability.”). 
 108. The same policy reasons that the Court has relied on in denying standing based on 
mere ideological interest apply with equal force to standing to defend. See, e.g., Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573 (1992) (rejecting standing based on ideological 
interest); see also Greening v. Moran, 953 F.2d 301, 305 (7th Cir. 1992) (“A litigant’s desire 
to vindicate a position does not establish standing.”). 
 109. A plaintiff seeking to establish standing must show not only that she has suffered a 
legally cognizable injury, but also that it was caused by the defendant’s actions, and that it 
would be remedied by the relief requested. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 509 (1975). 
 110. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 757–58 (1984) (denying standing to parents of 
minority schoolchildren because the line of causation between tax incentives and 
discriminatory private schools was “attenuated at best”); Warth, 422 U.S. at 509 (denying 
standing where the “asserted injury” was “conjectural” and “the line of causation between 
[the defendant’s] actions and [the] injury [wa]s not apparent from the complaint”). 
 111. Warth, 422 U.S. at 504 (denying standing where plaintiffs did not demonstrate that 
there was a “substantial probability” that preventing defendants’ actions would achieve 
plaintiff’s desired outcome); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617–18 (1973) 
(denying standing where plaintiff did not show that enforcement of the jail sentence for 
delinquent father would compel him to pay child support). 
 112. Warth, 422 U.S. at 493. 
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enjoined unlawful discrimination by the named defendants.113
In other cases, however, federal courts have used the concepts of 
causation and redressability to address doubts about the defendant’s 
personal stake in the litigation.
  In Warth, 
the defendants plainly had a stake in resisting the requested injunction; the 
denial of standing was based on uncertainty about whether unrelated third 
parties who could not be bound by the Court’s order would change their 
behavior if the Court enjoined the defendants’ alleged discrimination. 
114  Courts have, for instance, denied 
standing for lack of “causation” when plaintiffs challenging a law or policy 
sued a public official who may have had no authority to enforce the 
challenged statute.115  Cases in this category differ from the early causation 
and redressability cases in that the plaintiff’s ability to obtain effective 
relief does not depend on the actions of an unrelated third party subsequent 
to the court’s judgment.  Rather, the determination that standing is absent in 
these cases turns primarily on the degree to which the defendant has a stake 
in the outcome.  Such loose application of plaintiff standing doctrine is all 
too common, and it contributes to criticism of causation and redressability 
as “arbitrary” and manipulable.116
In short, despite occasional indications by the Court that Article III 
restricts defendant standing by imposing a requirement of personal stake on 
defendants in federal litigation, courts and scholars have uniformly failed to 
develop either a theory or a workable doctrine to guide decision making.  
Courts have instead pushed causation and redressability beyond their 
 
 
 113. Id. at 504–07. 
 114. See 13A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 58, § 3531.6, at 393 (discussing 
arbitrary lines drawn by redressability doctrine, and noting the “deeper conceptual problems” 
that may “spring from the subtle opportunity to interchange the concepts of injury and 
remedy”); id. § 3531.5, at 296 (noting the use of causation to dismiss cases of “plaintiffs 
who simply had sued the wrong defendants”). 
 115. See id. § 3531.5, at 364 (“A common variety of the public-official defendant cases 
involves actions brought by mistake or miscalculation against an official who lacks authority 
to enforce a challenged statute . . . .”); see also, e.g., Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 
1110 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he causation element of standing requires the named defendants 
to possess authority to enforce the complained-of provision.”); ACLU v. Florida Bar, 999 
F.2d 1486, 1490 (11th Cir. 1993) (“[W]hen a plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of a 
rule of law, it is the state official designated to enforce that rule who is the proper 
defendant . . . .”). 
 116. See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 107, at 171 (describing standing as “one of the most 
amorphous [concepts] in the entire domain of public law” (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 
83, 99 (1968)) (alteration in original)); William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 
YALE L.J. 221, 229–34 (1988); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Standing for Privilege:  The Failure of 
Injury Analysis, 82 B.U. L. REV. 301, 301–05 (2002) (arguing that causation and 
redressability requirements are merely “rhetorical barriers” that in practice do little to define 
standing requirements); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 
1741, 1775 (1999) (arguing that standing doctrine “is extraordinarily complicated and 
malleable.  In a high proportion of cases, a judge can write an opinion that either grants or 
denies standing without departing from the norms that define the craft of judging”); Robert J. 
Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers:  A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 
CORNELL L. REV. 393, 480 (1996); Sunstein, supra note 11, at 195–97; Steven L. Winter, 
The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 
1420–21 (1988); see also 13A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 58, § 3531.3, at 124. 
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intended parameters to deny standing to plaintiffs where the real issue is the 
defendant’s lack of a personal stake in the outcome.  In many cases, the 
result—dismissal for failure to present an Article III case or controversy—
is the same as it would be if the courts explicitly based the decision on 
defendant standing.  But this solution works only haphazardly, and it 
provides no framework for resolving questions of defendant standing in the 
critical set of cases in which third parties seek to intervene as defendants.117
C.  Illustrating Intervenor-Defendant Standing 
  
It would be theoretically more sensible, and more conducive to sound 
decision making, to serve the goals of defendant standing directly, by 
recognizing that Article III’s personal stake requirement applies to 
defendants as well as plaintiffs.  By fashioning the doctrine to fit more 
closely the purposes it ostensibly promotes, courts could serve those 
purposes better without exposing themselves to the criticisms that standing 
doctrine frequently inspires. 
If courts have managed to enforce a requirement of defendant standing 
using other doctrines, such as causation and redressability, one might ask 
whether the confusion in the current doctrine has had any ill effects.  The 
answer is most clearly seen in a limited set of public law cases in which the 
original defendant declines to defend a challenged law.  In such cases, any 
number of nonparties—legislators, citizens, or interest groups—may wish 
to take up the mantle.  Such participation may have significant policy 
repercussions and frequently will raise profound separation of powers 
concerns, giving added importance to the current doctrinal confusion.118
1.  Intervenors and Standing to Defend 
  
Two prominent cases now pending in the federal courts illustrate the 
problems presented by such intervenors, and provide useful case studies for 
exploring the application of Article III to defendants. 
Although the vast majority of federal litigation concerns only the parties 
named in the initial complaint, nonparties occasionally seek to intervene in 
pending cases, arguing that their interests may be affected by the court’s 
resolution of the matter.119  Only rarely, however, will such parties be 
required to establish standing in their own right.  Courts have almost always 
held that the case or controversy that exists between the original parties 
satisfies Article III’s jurisdictional requirement, and that intervenors need 
not independently establish Article III standing.120
 
 117. See infra Part III.C. 
  The rationale for this 
 118. See infra Part III.A. 
 119. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24. 
 120. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 233 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens 
United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (“The National Right to Life plaintiffs argue that the 
District Court’s grant of intervention to the intervenor-defendants . . . must be reversed 
because the intervenor-defendants lack Article III standing.  It is clear, however, that the 
Federal Election Commission (FEC) has standing, and therefore we need not address the 
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rule is that, where the case or controversy required for federal jurisdiction is 
present, the intervention of an additional party will not destroy the case or 
controversy.121
The exception to this general rule is that intervenors, whether aligned 
with plaintiffs or defendants, must independently satisfy Article III standing 
if they seek to litigate issues beyond those raised by the original parties,
 
122 
or if the case or controversy between the original parties ceases to exist, as 
it did in Diamond v. Charles.123
 
standing of the intervenor-defendants, whose position here is identical to the FEC’s.”); Ruiz 
v. Estelle, 161 F.3d 814, 830 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Article III does not require intervenors to 
independently possess standing where the intervention is into a subsisting and continuing 
Article III case or controversy and the ultimate relief sought by the intervenors is also being 
sought by at least one subsisting party with standing to do so.”); Associated Builders & 
Contractors v. Perry, 16 F.3d 688, 690 (6th Cir. 1994) (“An intervenor need not have the 
same standing necessary to initiate a lawsuit in order to intervene in an existing district court 
suit where the plaintiff has standing.”). 
  Thus, intervenors may piggyback on an 
 121. Prior to the Court’s decision in McConnell, there was a circuit split on the question 
of whether intervenors were required to independently demonstrate Article III standing.  
Most circuits had held that an intervenor was not required to show standing in the trial court, 
but could simply “piggyback” on the case or controversy that existed between the plaintiff 
and defendant. See, e.g., City of Colo. Springs v. Climax Molybdenum Co., 587 F.3d 1071, 
1079 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding that an intervenor “‘need not establish [independent] Article 
III standing so long as another party with constitutional standing on the same side as the 
intervenor remains in the case’” (alteration in original) (quoting San Juan Cnty. v. United 
States, 503 F.3d 1163, 1172 (10th Cir. 2007))); Ruiz, 161 F.3d at 830 (same); Associated 
Builders, 16 F.3d at 690 (same); Yniquez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(same); Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1213 (11th Cir. 1989) (“[A] party seeking to 
intervene need not demonstrate that he has standing in addition to meeting the requirements 
of Rule 24 as long as there exists a justiciable case and controversy between the parties 
already in the lawsuit.”); U.S. Postal Serv. v. Brennan, 579 F.2d 188, 190 (2d Cir. 1978) 
(holding that the existence of a case or controversy between original parties negated the need 
to impose standing requirements on the intervenor). 
  Before McConnell, three circuits had held that intervenors must show independent 
Article III standing to participate in a case. See, e.g., Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295, 1300 
(8th Cir. 1996); City of Cleveland v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 17 F.3d 1515, 1517 (D.C. 
Cir. 1994); United States v. 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d 855, 859 (7th Cir. 1985).  The 
McConnell Court’s holding that, where a case or controversy exists between the original 
parties, intervenors need not independently establish standing, however, calls these decisions 
into question.  Only one circuit has explicitly reaffirmed its rule after McConnell, and it did 
so without citing McConnell. See ACLU of Minn. v. Tarek Ibn Ziyad Acad., 643 F.3d 1088, 
1092 (8th Cir. 2011) (“‘In our circuit, a party seeking to intervene must establish Article III 
standing in addition to the requirements of Rule 24.’” (quoting United States v. Metro. St. 
Louis Sewer Dist., 569 F.3d 829, 838 (8th Cir. 2009))). 
 122. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 233 (holding that intervenor-defendant need not establish 
standing where original defendant had standing, and “[intervenor’s] position here is identical 
to the [original defendant’s]”); Ruiz, 161 F.3d at 830 (rejecting argument that intervenors 
must possess standing where “the ultimate relief sought by the intervenors is also being 
sought by at least one subsisting party with standing to do so”). 
 123. See 476 U.S. 54, 68 (1986) (“[A]n intervenor’s right to continue a suit in the absence 
of the party on whose side intervention was permitted is contingent upon a showing by the 
intervenor that he fulfills the requirements of Art. III.”); see also, e.g., Dillard v. Chilton 
Cnty. Comm’n, 495 F.3d 1324, 1336 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Having determined that the 
Intervenors cannot establish Article III standing of their own account, we turn now to the 
alternative mechanism available to them for doing so:  piggybacking upon the standing of 
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existing case or controversy, and litigate without standing.  But if they wish 
to exceed the scope of the existing case or controversy—either 
substantively, by raising issues not raised by the original parties124 or 
temporally, by pressing onward after their aligned party has chosen not to 
continue125
The standing to defend of intervenor-defendants thus becomes a 
determinative issue in a relatively small number of cases:  primarily, those 
in which the intervenor seeks appellate review of a trial court judgment not 
appealed by the original defendant, or seeks to assert defenses not raised by 
a party at the trial level.  The next sections illustrate how these complexities 
can arise, and show that, although rare, such cases may be highly 
consequential. 
—they must independently establish standing under Article III. 
2.  Intervenor-Defendant Standing to Appeal:  The Proposition 8 Litigation 
The circumstances in which defendant standing may become dispositive 
are illustrated by the pending federal litigation challenging California’s 
Proposition 8.  On November 4, 2008, California voters approved Ballot 
Proposition 8, which amended the California constitution to provide that 
“[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in 
California.”126  State court litigation commenced shortly thereafter, 
followed by litigation in federal court alleging that Proposition 8 violated 
the plaintiffs’ rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution.127  In the federal litigation, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, the 
plaintiffs prevailed in the district court, which issued an injunction 
prohibiting enforcement of Proposition 8.128
Perry featured an irregular roster of parties.  Neither of the named 
defendants (Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger and Attorney General Jerry 
 
 
the original parties.  However, doing so requires the existence of an ongoing adversarial case 
or controversy among existing parties . . . .”). 
 124. See, e.g., McConnell, 540 U.S. at 233 (holding that the standing of the intervenor-
defendant need not be addressed because its substantive position was identical to that of the 
FEC, who plainly had standing); Ruiz, 161 F.3d at 830 (“Article III does not require 
intervenors to independently possess standing where . . . the ultimate relief sought by the 
intervenors is also being sought by at least one subsisting party with standing to do so.”). 
 125. Diamond, 476 U.S. at 68 (“[A]n intervenor’s right to continue a suit in the absence 
of the party on whose side intervention was permitted is contingent upon a showing by the 
intervenor that he fulfills the requirements of Art. III.”); Mangual v. Rotger-Sabat, 317 F.3d 
45, 61 (1st Cir. 2003) (“It is clear that an intervenor, whether permissive or as of right, must 
have Article III standing in order to continue litigating if the original parties do not do so.”). 
 126. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7.5.  The final tally was 52.3 percent for, and 47.7 percent 
against. Votes for and Against November 4, 2008 State Ballot Measures, CAL. SECRETARY 
ST., http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2008_general/7_votes_for_against.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 23, 2012). 
 127. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d sub nom. 
Perry v. Brown, --- F.3d ----, Nos. 10-16696, 11-16577, 2012 WL 372713 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 
2012); Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009). 
 128. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 995, 1004. 
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Brown) was willing to defend Proposition 8’s constitutionality.129  The 
federal district judge permitted some of the original sponsors of the ballot 
proposition, including five individuals and an organization called 
ProtectMarriage.com, to intervene as defendants.130  The district court did 
not require the intervenors to demonstrate a personal stake in the outcome 
sufficient to create an Article III “case or controversy.”  Instead, the court 
reasoned that, because the named parties possessed such a personal stake, 
Ninth Circuit precedent established that the trial court possessed jurisdiction 
over the action, and had the discretion to permit the intervenors to 
piggyback on the existing case or controversy.131
Defendant’s standing took center stage only after entry of judgment, 
when the intervenor-defendants sought to appeal.  After the district court 
entered judgment for plaintiffs, the government-official defendants took no 
action, but the intervenor-defendants sought appellate review.
 
132  The 
Proposition 8 case thus squarely presented a potentially dispositive issue of 
defendant standing:  namely, whether Article III permitted the sponsors of 
Proposition 8 to appeal after the government officials responsible for that 
law’s enforcement themselves declined to appeal the judgment below.  The 
Ninth Circuit determined that the appellants’ standing to appeal depended 
on the nature of the interest, if any, given to official sponsors of an initiative 
under California law, and it therefore certified that question of state law to 
the California Supreme Court.133
 
 129. See Stephanie Condon, Prop. 8 Judges Chide Schwarzenegger, Brown for Not 
Defending Law, CBS NEWS (Dec. 6, 2010, 5:22 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-
503544_162-20024769-503544.html (stating that both liberal and conservative Ninth Circuit 
judges disapproved of the executive’s failure to defend Proposition 8); Maura Dolan, Gov. 
Won’t Defend Proposition 8, L.A. TIMES, June 18, 2009, at A4 (“California Atty. Gen. Jerry 
Brown, going farther than Schwarzenegger, said in his legal response to the suit last week 
that Proposition 8 violates the U.S. Constitution.”). 
  The state court rendered its decision on 
 130. Order Granting Motion to Intervene at 3, Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (No. 09-2292), 
available at https://ecf.cand.uscourts.gov/cand/09cv2292/files/76.pdf.  For simplicity, I will 
refer to the intervenor-defendants collectively as “ProtectMarriage.com” or “intervenor-
defendants.”  
 131. Id. (stating that intervention at the district court level is governed by Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure Rule 24(a), and not the Article III “Case or Controversy” requirement).  To 
the extent that a piggybacking intervenor is barred from raising arguments not raised by its 
aligned party, the correctness of the district court’s intervention decision in Perry is open to 
question. See supra Part II.C.1. 
 132. The Administration’s Opposition to Defendant-Intervenors’ Motion for Stay Pending 
Appeal at 3, Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (No. 09-2292), available at 
https://ecf.cand.uscourts.gov/cand/09cv2292/files/717.pdf (implying that the Governor 
would not appeal the district court’s ruling and arguing that allowing the court’s “judgment 
to take effect serves the public interest”); Attorney General’s Opposition to Defendant-
Intervenors’ Motion for Stay Pending Appeal at 2, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 
921 (No. 09-2292), available at https://ecf.cand.uscourts.gov/cand/09cv2292/files/716.pdf 
(stating that the Attorney General would no longer defend the case because “the public 
interest weighs against [Proposition 8’s] continued enforcement”). 
 133. The question certified was:   
  Whether under Article II, Section 8 of the California Constitution, or otherwise 
under California law, the official proponents of an initiative measure possess either 
a particularized interest in the initiative’s validity or the authority to assert the 
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the certified question in November 2011, holding that “when public 
officials decline to defend a voter-approved initiative or assert the state’s 
interest in the initiative’s validity, under California law the official 
proponents of an initiative measure are authorized to assert the state’s 
interest in the validity of the initiative and to appeal a judgment invalidating 
the measure.”134  On February 7, 2012, as this Article went to press, the 
Ninth Circuit rendered its decision, finding that, as a matter of federal law, 
the official sponsors of Proposition 8 possess standing to defend that 
proposition, including standing to appeal the district court’s judgment.135
3.  Intervenor-Defendant Standing in the Trial Court:  
The Defense of Marriage Act Litigation 
  
Defendant standing may also be dispositive in a number of pending cases 
concerning the constitutionality of the Defense of Marriage Act.  DOMA 
became law on September 21, 1996, passing with veto-proof majorities in 
both houses of Congress.136  DOMA defines “marriage” for purposes of 
interpreting any federal law as consisting only of “a legal union between 
one man and one woman as husband and wife,” and defines “spouse” to 
mean only “a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”137  In 
addition, DOMA provides that states need not recognize marriages 
performed in another state if they are not between one man and one 
woman.138
DOMA’s federal definition of “marriage” and “spouse” have been 
challenged in numerous cases as violating the Fifth Amendment due 
process rights of married same-sex couples.
 
139
 
State's interest in the initiative's validity, which would enable them to defend the 
constitutionality of the initiative upon its adoption or appeal a judgment 
invalidating the initiative, when the public officials charged with that duty refuse 
to do so.  
  Until recently, the federal 
Perry v. Brown, --- F.3d ----, Nos. 10-16696, 11-16577, 2012 WL 372713, at *6 (9th Cir. 
Feb. 7, 2012). 
 134. Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1015 (Cal. 2011) (emphasis added). 
 135. Perry, --- F.3d ----, 2012 WL 372713, at *7–9 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2012).  The Ninth 
Circuit’s thoughtful opinion is fully consistent with the approach to defendant standing 
outlined in this Article. See infra Part IV.B. 
 136. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 
U.S.C. § 7 (2006) and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006)).  The bill garnered 85 votes in the Senate 
and 342 in the House. 142 CONG. REC. 22,467; id. at 17,094 (1996). 
 137. 1 U.S.C. § 7. 
 138. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C. 
 139. See, e.g., In re Levenson, 587 F.3d 925 (9th Cir. 2009); Smelt v. Cnty. of Orange, 
447 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 2006); Dragovich v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 764 F. Supp. 2d 1178 
(N.D. Cal. 2011); Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010); 
Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (M.D. Fla. 2005); In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123 (Bankr. 
W.D. Wash. 2004).  As of this writing, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group, an arm of the 
leadership of the House of Representatives, currently consisting of three Republicans and 
two Democrats, has successfully sought to intervene in a number of cases challenging 
section 3 of DOMA.  For simplicity, this Article focuses on one of these pending cases, 
Windsor v. United States, No. 10-civ-8435 (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 9, 2010), although the 
others raise similar issues. 
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government defended the constitutionality of these definitional provisions.  
On February 23, 2011, however, Attorney General Eric Holder announced a 
change of policy in a letter to Speaker of the House John Boehner.140  
Holder’s letter stated that in circuits that had held that classifications based 
on sexual orientation were subject to rational basis review, the 
Administration had defended section 3 of DOMA as meeting that standard.  
But two recent cases, filed in the Second Circuit, where the standard of 
review was an open question, had prompted the Administration to 
“conclude[] that classifications based on sexual orientation warrant 
heightened scrutiny,” and that “Section 3 of DOMA is unconstitutional” 
under that standard.141  Accordingly, Holder stated, “the President has 
instructed the Department not to defend the statute in Windsor and 
Pedersen, now pending in the Southern District of New York and the 
District of Connecticut.”142  Finally, Holder stated his intention to notify 
the courts in Windsor143 and Pedersen144 “of our interest in providing 
Congress a full and fair opportunity to participate in the litigation in those 
cases.”145
On March 4, 2011, Speaker Boehner announced his intention to convene 
the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG), a standing body of the 
House of Representatives,
 
146 to consider how the House should proceed.  
On April 18, 2011, he announced that BLAG would pursue the defense of 
DOMA in place of the Department of Justice, and that BLAG had hired 
former Solicitor General Paul Clement as lead counsel to defend DOMA.147
 
 140. See Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen. of the United States, to John A. 
Boehner, Speaker of the U.S. House of Reps. (Feb. 23, 2011), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html [hereinafter Holder Letter]. 
  
Clement promptly filed briefs in several pending cases, including Windsor 
v. United States, a case pending in the Southern District of New York, 
seeking permission for BLAG to intervene “for the limited purpose of 
 141. Id. at 2, 5. 
 142. Id. at 5.  Holder further stated that the Executive Branch would continue to enforce 
DOMA section 3, until it was repealed by Congress or held unconstitutional by “the judicial 
branch.” Id. 
 143. Windsor, No. 10-civ-8435. 
 144. Pedersen v. Office of Personnel Mgmt., 3:10-cv-01750 (D. Conn. filed Nov. 9, 
2010).   
 145. Holder Letter, supra note 140, at 6. 
 146. BLAG is composed of five members of the House leadership:  the Speaker, the 
Majority and Minority Leaders, and the Majority and Minority Whips. See Press Release, 
Office of John Boehner, Statement by Congressman John Boehner (R-West Chester) 
Regarding the Defense of Marriage Act (Mar. 4, 2011), available at 
http://johnboehner.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=227399. 
 147. Letter from John Boehner, Speaker of the House of Representatives, to Nancy 
Pelosi, House Minority Leader (Apr. 18, 2011), available at 
http://johnboehner.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=237443; Michael 
D. Shear, Law Firm Backs Out of Defending Marriage Act, N.Y. TIMES CAUCUS (Apr. 25, 
2011, 12:28 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/25/law-firm-backs-out-of-
defending-marriage-act-partner-resigns/. 
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defending the constitutionality of Section III” of DOMA.148
Even had the trial court in Windsor denied the motion to intervene, 
BLAG might, of course, have been permitted to participate as amicus 
curiae.  One might wonder, then, what significance party status has.  First, 
status as a party permits substantially more latitude to determine the course 
of the litigation in the trial court.  Parties may conduct discovery, file 
motions, and examine witnesses, while amici are typically restricted to 
filing briefs, and even then, only after application to the court.
  The parties in 
Windsor did not oppose the motion to intervene, and the court granted it. 
149  In 
Windsor, for instance, BLAG participated actively in discovery150 and filed 
a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint, prompting the Department of 
Justice attorneys representing the named defendant to oppose that motion, 
arguing that section 3 of DOMA was unconstitutional.151  Second, amici 
have no appeal rights, while intervenor-defendants may, as discussed 
above, be entitled to appeal even when their aligned parties elect not to.152
III.  UNDERSTANDING DEFENDANT STANDING 
 
Although there is powerful support in logic, constitutional text, and case 
law for the notion that Article III requires parties on both sides to possess a 
personal stake, the doctrine of defendant standing remains under-theorized.  
Much has been written—by the Court and by scholars—about the nature of 
the personal stake that plaintiffs must possess, but almost nothing has been 
written about the personal stake that Article III requires of the defendant.  
This part addresses that question and derives an approach to defendant 
standing from the cases in which the Court has applied Article III 
restrictions to defendants, and from the functions that standing doctrine is 
designed to serve. 
A.  The Functions of Defendant Standing 
The standing doctrine has been defended on both Article II and Article III 
grounds.153  The functions it serves include protecting the Executive 
Branch against usurpation of its authority by Congress and the judiciary,154
 
 148. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Unopposed Motion of the 
Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the U.S. House of Representatives to Intervene for a 
Limited Purpose at 4, Windsor, No. 10-civ-8435 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2011), 2011 WL 
3164126. 
 
 149. See SUP. CT. R. 37. 
 150. See Plaintiff’s Letter Brief in Support of Motion to Compel, at 1–2, Windsor, No. 
10-civ-8435 (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2011), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/
ltr_7_18_2011.pdf (noting that BLAG had insisted on party status, rather than amicus status, 
and had participated in discovery). 
 151. See Defendant United States’ Memorandum of Law in Response to Plaintiff’s 
Motion for Summary Judgment and Intervenor’s Motion to Dismiss, at 4–28, Windsor, No. 
10-civ-8435 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2011), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/8-
19_doj_brief.pdf. 
 152. See supra Part II.C.1–2. 
 153. See supra Part I.A. 
 154.  See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992). 
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and promoting sound judicial decision making.  Standing serves the former 
goal by limiting who may enforce the law, and the latter goal in part by 
requiring that issues are presented to the courts in a concrete factual setting 
by advocates with sufficient motivation to litigate effectively,155 and by 
prohibiting claims brought by concerned bystanders with exclusively 
ideological aims, rather than individuals whose real-world interests are at 
stake.156
1. Defendant Standing and the Structure of the Federal Government 
  Each of these familiar functions counsels in favor of a model of 
standing that limits not only who may bring a federal action, but also who 
may defend one.   
The same separation of powers concerns that underlie restrictions on 
plaintiff standing157 apply equally to the standing of defendants.  Standing 
is “founded in a concern about the proper—and properly limited—role of 
the courts in a democratic society,”158 so that the standing inquiry is 
“especially rigorous when reaching the merits of the dispute would force 
[the Court] to decide whether an action taken by one of the other two 
branches of the Federal Government was unconstitutional.”159  Standing 
also preserves the Executive Branch’s control over the enforcement and 
defense of federal laws.160  The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that to 
permit private parties to vindicate the public interest in enforcement of a 
law would threaten the separation of powers because it undermines “the 
Chief Executive’s most important constitutional duty, to ‘take Care that the 
Laws be faithfully executed.’”161  Thus, the Court has looked askance at 
claims of standing founded on nothing more than “vindication of the rule of 
law.”162  Separation of powers concerns make it difficult to establish 
standing where a litigant’s “asserted injury arises from the government’s 
allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone else.”163
These concerns apply equally in circumstances in which an intervenor 
seeks to defend a federal law that the President regards as unconstitutional.  
The most salient feature of the category of cases that we are here concerned 
with—public law cases featuring volunteer defendants—is that the 
executive branch declined to defend the laws in question.  A case in which 
 
 
 155. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (stating that the personal stake 
requirement assures “that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues 
upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional 
questions”). 
 156. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192 (1974) (Powell, J., 
concurring). 
 157. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (stating that standing is “built on a 
single basic idea—the idea of separation of powers”). 
 158. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). 
 159. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819–20 (1997). 
 160. See supra Part I.A. 
 161. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. 
II, § 3). 
 162. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 106 (1998). 
 163. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562. 
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the President refuses to defend a federal law can readily be seen as an 
instance of our divided government functioning as intended.  The power to 
pursue the government’s interest by defending (or not defending) a law is 
an important component of the Executive’s authority.164  The Chief 
Executive’s decision not to defend a particular statute on the ground that it 
is inconsistent with the higher law of the Constitution is a straightforward 
exercise of his duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed; faced 
with contradictory laws, he must determine which one takes precedence.165  
To allow a nonparty to assert defenses that the Executive has chosen not to 
assert, or to appeal when the Executive declines to do so, necessarily shifts 
that power from the Executive to the courts and Congress, by delegating to 
the intervenor the Executive’s duty to “‘take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed.’”166  Permitting private citizens (or legislators) to 
litigate in defense of a statute that the Executive has determined to be 
unconstitutional thus “would enable the courts, with the permission of 
Congress, to assume a position of authority over the governmental acts of 
another and co-equal department, and to become virtually continuing 
monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive action.”167
 
 164. See Scalia, supra note 
  The Court, 
as Justice Scalia wrote in Lujan, has “always rejected that vision of [its] 
58, at 897 (“Where no peculiar harm to particular individuals 
or minorities is in question, lots of once-heralded programs ought to get lost or misdirected, 
in [the federal bureaucracy] or elsewhere . . . [t]he ability to lose or misdirect laws can be 
said to be one of the prime engines of social change.”).   
 165. I bracket for purposes of this discussion the larger question about when, if ever, a 
President may legitimately decline to defend a duly enacted law.  When such decisions are 
based on policy grounds, they may be deeply problematic. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra 
note 17, at 583–84 (stating that Article II’s “Take Care” clause “mak[es] . . . clear that the 
President has no royal prerogative to suspend statutes”); Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency 
Action After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 653, 670 (1985) (arguing that “the ‘take 
Care’ clause does not authorize the executive to fail to enforce those laws of which it 
disapproves”); see also Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 
2347 (2001) (discussing the “risk that presidential administration might displace the 
preferences of a prior . . . Congress by interpreting statutes inconsistently with their drafters’ 
objectives”).   
  For our purposes, it is sufficient to note that when the refusal to defend a law is 
based on the President’s good faith opinion that a law is unconstitutional, the legitimacy of 
the refusal to defend is likely at its greatest, in light of the President’s oath to “preserve, 
protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8; see 
also Grove, supra note 20, at 798 n.56 (“Because the Constitution is the supreme law that 
the Executive Branch is charged with faithfully executing, it should perhaps decline to 
enforce seemingly unconstitutional provisions.”). But see Arthur S. Miller, The President 
and Faithful Execution of the Laws, 40 VAND. L. REV. 389, 397 (1987) (considering this 
possibility, but concluding that the President should enforce the law even in this context).   
 166. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577 (quoting U.S. CONST. art II, § 3). 
 167. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Barnes v. Kline, 
759 F.2d 21, 42 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting) (“By according congressmen standing 
to sue the President, this court proposes a new and much different answer to the question of 
the proper role of the federal courts in American constitutional disputation.  Changing the 
constitutional role of the federal courts, moreover, necessarily also alters that of Congress 
and the President, and seems, on the rationale the majority advances, destined to alter that of 
the States as well.”). 
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role.”168  The Court has adhered instead to “the Art. III notion that federal 
courts may exercise power only ‘in the last resort, and as a necessity.’”169
In sum, the very same separation of powers policies that support limiting 
plaintiff standing apply with equal force to defendant standing.
   
170  Indeed, 
these separation of powers concerns are at their highest ebb where the 
would-be defendant is Congress itself, as in the DOMA litigation, because 
the concern about impinging on the President’s authority is magnified when 
Congress also seeks to aggrandize its own power.171
To be sure, these principles apply differently in the Proposition 8 and 
DOMA cases.  Federal separation of powers concerns do not apply in cases 
challenging state laws, such as the Proposition 8 litigation.
 
172  States may 
have their own state law separation of powers reasons for denying standing 
to intervenor-defendants (or intervenor-plaintiffs),173 but if a state court 
resolves those issues in favor of intervenor standing, then federalism 
dictates a degree of deference to that conclusion by federal courts.174
 
 168. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577. 
  Thus, 
the Article II theories of standing restrict intervenor standing only in cases 
in which the intervenor seeks to enforce or defend federal law.  An 
 169. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (quoting Chi. & Grand Trunk Ry. v. 
Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345 (1892)). 
 170. One’s assessment of whether judicial intervention is appropriate in these 
circumstances might, of course, differ depending on whether the would-be intervenor has a 
plausible claim to the authority to represent the state’s interest.  Thus, the Executive’s 
prerogative to choose whether or not to defend a law may be merely a default rule, subject to 
legislative revision.  But this line of argument has been roundly rejected by the Court, which 
has held, time and time again, that Congress cannot grant a right to sue to someone who does 
not possess a concrete, personal, and particularized injury. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573.  
“Congress cannot erase Article III’s standing requirements by statutorily granting the right to 
sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise have standing.” Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 
820 n.3 (1997).  Although Raines and Lujan concern plaintiff standing, the analysis is the 
same.  If Congress can confer on an individual the Executive’s power to represent the state’s 
interest in defending the law, there is no reason in principle why it cannot also confer the 
state’s interest in enforcing the law. 
 171. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726–27 (1986) (finding that a statute that 
vested sole authority in Congress to remove an Executive official violated separation of 
powers because Congress may not aggrandize itself by exceeding the outer limits of its 
power); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976) (per curiam) (finding that the separation 
of powers doctrine contains “a self-executing safeguard against the encroachment or 
aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other”); see also Neil Kinkopf, Of 
Devolution, Privatization, and Globalization:  Separation of Powers Limits on 
Congressional Authority to Assign Federal Power to Non-federal Actors, 50 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 331, 347 (1998) (noting that “the anti-aggrandizement principle applies only to how 
power is allocated among the three branches of the federal government”); infra Part IV.A.  
 172. See Lynch, supra note 20, at 2028–29 (“[F]ederal separation of powers doctrine does 
not apply in a rigorous fashion to arrangements between the branches of state 
government . . . .”). 
 173. See Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1028 (Cal. 2011) (rejecting a separation of 
powers challenge to intervenor defendant standing under the California state constitution). 
 174. See Perry v. Brown, --- F.3d ----, Nos. 10-16696, 11-16577, 2012 WL 372713, at *8 
(9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2012) (holding that states may “decide for themselves who may assert their 
interests and under what circumstances, and [may] bestow that authority accordingly”); see 
also id. (“Principles of federalism require that federal courts respect such decisions by the 
states as to who may speak for them . . . .”). 
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intervenor who seeks to enforce or defend state law may do so without 
raising federal separation of powers concerns. 
2.  Defendant Standing and Judicial Decision Making 
The Article III justifications for standing doctrine—that it improves 
judicial decision making, and limits the federal courts to their appropriate 
constitutional role—are also served by applying Article III standing 
limitations to defendants.  Moreover, they apply with full force in both the 
DOMA and Proposition 8 cases.  Article III’s injury requirement is 
ordinarily not satisfied by a litigant’s desire that a law be enforced against 
someone else.  In the plaintiff standing context, the Supreme Court has 
distinguished between cases in which “the plaintiff is himself an object of 
the action (or foregone action) at issue,” so that “there is ordinarily little 
question” about standing, and cases in which the “plaintiff’s asserted injury 
arises from the government’s allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of 
regulation) of someone else,” in which it is far more difficult for the 
plaintiff to establish standing.175
Similarly, recognizing that defendants must have a personal stake 
conserves judicial resources by limiting the arguments that may be raised 
by an intervenor-defendant, and by facilitating the dismissal of cases in 
which the intervenor-defendant is the only defendant who wishes to litigate 
at all.  In most cases, as noted above, defendant standing is plainly present, 
and is not litigated.  The few cases in which requiring defendant standing 
would affect the outcome are those in which the defendant intervenors lack 
a concrete and particularized injury.  In those cases, the conventional view 
of standing as focused on the plaintiff may not permit dismissal of the case, 
because the plaintiff possesses an adequate personal stake.  In contrast, 
recognizing that Article III’s personal stake requirement extends to 
defendants would permit dismissal, thereby conserving judicial resources. 
  This principle would seem to apply no 
less to defendants than to plaintiffs.  Requiring that defendants possess a 
personal stake facilitates better judicial decision making by ensuring that all 
parties are strongly motivated and thus guarantees vigorous advocacy on 
both sides.  Moreover, the application of a personal stake requirement to 
both plaintiffs and defendants ensures that there is a close relationship 
between the plaintiff’s legal claim and requested remedy, on the one hand, 
and the defendant, on the other.  This close connection helps ensure that 
legal issues are presented to the court in a concrete factual setting that will 
facilitate analysis and decision making. 
In sum, bringing defendant standing out into the open would facilitate 
better decision making by simplifying the doctrine and pushing courts to 
give explicit consideration to the separation of powers and other policies 
that the doctrine means to serve.  Moreover, in the context of challenges to 
federal law, it would protect the Executive Branch against usurpation of its 
power by the other branches. 
 
 175. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561–62 (1992). 
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B.  Assessing the Defendant’s Personal Stake 
If a necessary condition for an Article III case or controversy is that both 
parties possess an adequate personal stake in the action, the question 
becomes:  what sort of showing will suffice to establish a defendant’s 
personal stake?  I argue that a fairly straightforward rubric for assessing 
defendant standing can be derived from the various decisions in which the 
Court has had occasion to assess the Article III standing of defendants, and 
from the purposes that standing doctrine is intended to serve.  In particular, 
I argue, a defendant may establish standing to defend in three ways.  First, a 
defendant against whom a claim is asserted can establish standing to defend 
simply by showing that the plaintiff seeks relief against her.  A defendant as 
to whom no claim is asserted—typically an intervenor-defendant—can 
establish standing to defend either by showing a reasonable apprehension of 
injury from judicial resolution of the plaintiff’s claim, or by establishing a 
right, conferred by state or federal law, to defend against the plaintiff’s 
claim. 
1.  Defendants as to Whom a Remedy Is Sought 
With respect to the first category, when a remedy—most often damages 
or an in personam injunction—is actually sought against the defendant, the 
standing of that particular defendant is easily established.176  The Court has 
so held, and properly so, inasmuch as the defendant from whom the 
plaintiff seeks relief has a due process right to oppose the requested 
relief,177
Courts are already familiar with this approach to assessing a party’s 
personal stake in the closely related setting of determining standing to 
initiate a declaratory judgment action.  In terms of Article III standing, 
declaratory judgment plaintiffs are similarly situated to defendants in other 
actions:  both are faced with a legal claim or the threat thereof.  And in both 
contexts, the Court has assessed standing in terms of the threat of injury.
 and thus a sufficient personal stake to do so. 
178
 
 176. See supra Part II.A.2. 
  
If, as the Court has held, the mere threat of litigation seeking relief against a 
party is sufficient to establish the personal stake required by Article III, then 
a fortiori, the actual commencement of litigation seeking concrete relief 
 177. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970). 
 178. The standing of a declaratory judgment plaintiff turns on whether she reasonably 
anticipates practical and/or legal consequences from the assertion of the threatened claim. 
See Nashville, Chattanooga, & St. Louis Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 264 (1933) (holding 
that a declaratory judgment proceeding was justiciable “so long as the case retains the 
essentials of an adversary proceeding, involving a real, not a hypothetical, controversy”); see 
also Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241 (1937) (holding that the Declaratory 
Judgment Act was constitutional, and permitting declaratory judgment in “a concrete case 
admitting of an immediate and definitive determination of the legal rights of the parties in an 
adversary proceeding . . . although the adjudication of the rights of the litigants may not 
require the award of process or the payment of damages”).  Similarly, as discussed above, 
the standing of a defendant is established by the risk of injury should the court grant relief on 
plaintiff’s claim. See supra Part III.B. 
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against a defendant must give that defendant a sufficient personal stake to 
satisfy the Cases or Controversies Clause.179
This path to establishing defendant standing applies as well to cases at 
the appeal stage as to those at the trial stage.  When a defendant seeks to 
attack the judgment below, the general test for standing to appeal is whether 
the appellant is “aggrieved” by the judgment.
  In light of the similarities 
between defendants and declaratory relief plaintiffs, it is perplexing that 
courts have treated them differently for standing purposes, by focusing on 
the personal stake of a declaratory relief plaintiff, but not consistently 
taking the same approach in assessing the personal stake of a defendant. 
180  A party is aggrieved by 
the judgment below if it imposes a cognizable injury on that party—by, for 
instance, requiring the party to pay money or abide by the terms of an 
injunction.181  Thus, a defendant may establish the requisite injury for 
purposes of an appeal simply by showing that he or she is subject to an 
allegedly incorrect lower court judgment.182
2.  Defendants as to Whom No Remedy Is Sought 
  Indeed, a defendant-appellant 
aggrieved by the judgment below has standing even more clearly than a 
defendant at the trial level, because she is actually affected by a judgment, 
rather than merely threatened by one. 
With respect to defendants against whom no remedy is sought, typically 
intervenor-defendants, the picture is more complicated.  An intervenor-
defendant against whom no claim is asserted may seek to establish standing 
 
 179. Some courts have explicitly recognized the close relationship between the standing 
required of a declaratory relief plaintiff and the personal stake of a defendant. See, e.g., 
Collin Cnty., Tex. v. Homeowners Ass’n for Values Essential to Neighborhoods (HAVEN), 
915 F.2d 167, 172 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that the county’s declaratory relief action against 
homeowners’ association was non-justiciable where county could not have been made a 
defendant had homeowners’ association sued); Peick v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 724 
F.2d 1247, 1258 n.10, 1260 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that defendant was the proper 
defendant, in part based on determination that defendant would have had standing to initiate 
declaratory relief action). 
 180. ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 623–24 (1989) (finding standing to appeal 
for defendant-appellant based on injury from judgment below); Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. 
Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 333 (1980); see also Steinman, supra note 6, at 840. 
 181. Roper, 445 U.S. at 333 (“A party who receives all that he has sought generally is not 
aggrieved by the judgment affording the relief and cannot appeal from it.”); Rinehart v. Saint 
Luke’s S. Hosp., No. 10-2209, 2011 WL 3348234, at *8 (D. Kan. Aug. 3, 2011) (“‘A party 
is aggrieved whose legal right is invaded by an act complained of or whose pecuniary 
interest is directly affected by the order.’” (quoting Fairfax Drainage Dist. v. City of Kan. 
City, 374 P.2d 35 (1962))); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 77 (9th ed. 2009) (defining 
aggrieved as “having been harmed by an infringement of legal rights”). 
 182. Indeed, the injury inflicted by an allegedly erroneous judgment may be sufficient to 
anchor federal jurisdiction even where the plaintiff’s stake in the outcome did not meet 
federal justiciability standards.  When a plaintiff has secured a judgment, a defendant injured 
by that judgment will be permitted to appeal, even if the plaintiff has no personal stake in the 
outcome under federal law.  The Court has so held, both in cases where the plaintiff lacked 
standing from the outset of the litigation, see ASARCO, 490 U.S. at 618, 623, and in cases 
where the plaintiff’s claim became arguably moot after entry of judgment, see City of Erie v. 
Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 288–89 (2000). 
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by showing a reasonable apprehension of injury from judicial resolution of 
the plaintiff’s claim.  In such cases, the showing required for a plaintiff 
seeking to demonstrate standing again provides an illuminating point of 
comparison.  The linchpin of Article III standing as applied to plaintiffs is 
that the plaintiff must show that she or he has personally suffered an injury 
as a result of the defendant’s conduct,183 or that the relevant legislature has 
validly conferred standing on the plaintiff.184  In the context of declaratory 
relief, the injury requirement is satisfied by the plaintiff’s reasonable 
apprehension of being sued by the defendant.185  Of course, Congress 
cannot create standing where no injury exists.  Thus, valid legislative 
conferrals of standing will commonly involve either the creation of a right 
or the delegation to the plaintiff of the authority to represent the state or 
federal government’s own interest.186
The appropriate test for assessing the standing of intervenor-defendants 
follows from these examples.  The personal stake of intervenor-defendants 
may be assessed by looking to whether there is a reasonable risk that the 
judicial resolution of the plaintiff’s claim will injure some legally 
protectable interest of the defendant.  This standard may be satisfied where 
the court’s resolution of the plaintiff’s claims may adversely affect the 
intervenor-defendant, even absent a grant of relief against the defendant 
directly.  For instance, property owners may seek to intervene as defendants 
in litigation under environmental laws in which the court’s resolution of the 
plaintiff’s claim could indirectly limit development of their land.
 
187  
Similarly, in legislative standing cases, legislators may seek to intervene to 
prevent an “institutional injury,” even where there is no request for a 
remedy against the legislator or the legislature.  In such cases, defendant 
standing is satisfied by the intervenor-defendant’s reasonable expectation of 
harm resulting from judicial resolution of the plaintiff’s claims.  
Conversely, where the intervenor-defendant will not be adversely affected 
by a court order resolving the plaintiff’s claims, as in Diamond v. Charles, 
standing to defend has been denied.188
 
 183. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 
454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (citations omitted); see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 
(1984). 
 
 184. See, e.g., Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 
773 (2000) (holding that qui tam relators have standing under Article III because the False 
Claims Act constituted “a partial assignment of the Government's damages claim”); Karcher 
v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 75, 80 (1987) (noting that state legislators were invested by state law 
with the authority to assert the state’s interest in the constitutionality of a law). 
 185. See Nashville, Chattanooga, & St. Louis Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 264 (1933); 
see also Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241 (1937). 
 186. See supra Part I.C; see also, e.g., Vt. Agency of Natural Res., 529 U.S. at 771–78; 
Karcher, 484 U.S. at 75–78, 80. 
 187. See, e.g., Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Babbitt, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1285 (E.D. Cal. 
2000) (permitting property owners to intervene as defendants in an Endangered Species Act 
case brought by environmental group challenging the Secretary of Interior’s failure to protect 
a habitat). 
 188. See supra Part II.A.3. 
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Finally, defendants may establish the requisite personal stake by showing 
that the law confers on them a right to defend against the plaintiff’s claim.  
Although such laws are relatively rare, the Court has explicitly recognized 
that they confer a sufficient personal stake to create a case or controversy.  
In Karcher v. May,189 for instance, the Court pointed to a specialized 
provision of New Jersey state law in finding that defendants initially 
possessed standing to defend, and that they later lost it when they were 
removed from their positions of legislative leadership.190  In contrast, the 
Court in Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona expressed skepticism 
about the intervenor-defendants’ standing to defend a law where no state 
law appeared to confer any such right on the intervenors.191
C.  Rule 24 and Defendant Standing 
 
One might ask whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24’s 
requirements for intervention obviate the need to recognize that the Article 
III standing requirement applies to defendants as well as plaintiffs.  To be 
sure, there is some affinity between the two doctrines.  Rule 24(a)’s 
requirement of “an interest relating to the property or transaction”192 
precludes intervention of right by many prospective intervenors who also 
would be unable to satisfy a requirement of defendant standing.  But 
although the requirements overlap, they are not identical.  Rule 24 permits 
intervention in some cases in which the model of defendant standing 
articulated above would not be satisfied, and it permits courts to deny 
intervention even where the intervenor-defendant does possess standing.193
First, Rule 24(a)’s interest requirement is not perfectly contiguous with 
that of Article III’s Cases or Controversies Clause.  The Rule requires “an 
interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the 
action,” which the federal courts have not construed to be quite as rigorous 
as Article III’s standing requirements.
 
194  The Supreme Court has held that 
intervenors need not independently satisfy Article III standing requirements 
so long as they do not exceed the scope of the underlying case or 
controversy.195
 
 189. 84 U.S. 72 (1987). 
  Most circuits have recognized that intervenors may satisfy 
 190. See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 191. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 65 (1997). 
 192. Rule 24(a) permits intervention as a matter of right to anyone who  
is given an unconditional right to intervene by federal statute[,] or claims an 
interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and 
is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or 
impede the movant’s ability to protect its interest, unless existing parties 
adequately represent that interest.  
FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a) (permitting intervention of right “on timely motion”). 
 193. The Rule permits the court to deny intervention, notwithstanding the prospective 
intervenor’s interest in the outcome, where “existing parties adequately represent that 
interest.” FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2). 
 194. See supra Part II.C.1. 
 195. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 233 (2003), overruled in part by Citizens 
United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (declining to address standing of the intervenor-
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Rule 24(a) without demonstrating an interest sufficient to establish Article 
III standing.196  And even those circuits that have required intervenors to 
demonstrate Article III standing have recognized that Article III imposes a 
different and higher standard than Rule 24(a).197  Moreover, Rule 24(b), 
unlike Rule 24(a), imposes no requirement that the intervenor possess an 
interest at all; it authorizes intervention by anyone who “has a claim or 
defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or 
fact.”198
The DOMA litigation nicely illustrates the substantial space between the 
requirements of Rule 24 and those of Article III standing.  Lower courts in 
numerous circuits have granted BLAG’s motions to intervene on the vague 
ground that federal legislators have an “interest” in the validity of federal 
laws, without even considering the high bar imposed by federal legislative 
standing doctrine.
  
199  This highlights an important formal difference 
between Rule 24 and Article III standing:  Article III standing is a 
jurisdictional rule that mandates dismissal where standing is lacking.  It 
thus serves to ensure that courts do not act in excess of their jurisdiction.  
Rule 24 is not regarded as limiting courts’ jurisdiction, and it serves a 
different set of goals.  The Rule’s leniency allows district court judges to 
balance the Federal Rules’ aims of efficiency, accuracy, and fairness by 
permitting a litigant who may possess special insight or incentive, or whose 
interests may not be fully protected by the existing parties, to intervene.200
IV.  APPLYING DEFENDANT STANDING 
  
This is all to the good when the court’s jurisdiction is established by an 
existing case or controversy, but Rule 24 cannot serve to keep courts within 
Article III’s bounds.  For that purpose, a clearer understanding of Article 
III’s application to defendants is required.   
This part applies the model of standing to defend developed in Part III to 
the DOMA and Proposition 8 litigation, and argues that BLAG’s standing 
 
defendant where the named defendant had standing and the intervenor-defendant took a 
position identical to the named defendant). 
 196.  See, e.g., Ruiz v. Estelle, 161 F.3d 814, 830 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Article III does not 
require intervenors to independently possess standing . . . .”); Associated Builders & 
Contractors v. Perry, 16 F.3d 688, 690 (6th Cir. 1994) (“An intervenor need not have the 
same standing necessary to initiate a lawsuit . . . .”). See generally supra Part II.C.1. 
 197. See, e.g., ACLU of Minn. v. Tarek Ibn Ziyad Acad., 643 F.3d 1088, 1092 (8th Cir. 
2011) (“‘In our circuit, a party seeking to intervene must establish Article III standing in 
addition to the requirements of Rule 24.’” (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Metro. 
St. Louis Sewer Dist., 569 F.3d 829, 838 (8th Cir. 2009))). 
 198. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b) (permitting intervention, on “timely motion” and with the 
court’s permission, to anyone who satisfies the requirement quoted in text, or who “is given 
a conditional right to intervene by a federal statute”). 
 199. See, e.g., Dragovich v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 764 F. Supp. 2d 1178 (N.D. Cal. 
2011); Windsor v. United States, No. 10-civ-8435 (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 9, 2010); Gill v. 
Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010). 
 200. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (stating that the Rules “should be construed and administered to 
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding”). 
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to defend DOMA in the various cases in which it has intervened turns on 
whether BLAG can establish its personal stake under the Court’s legislative 
standing case law.  Similarly, the standing to defend of the intervenors in 
the Proposition 8 litigation depends on whether California state law confers 
the state’s interest in defending a law enacted by ballot proposition on the 
official proponents of that ballot initiative.  I conclude that intervenor 
standing to defend is proper in the Proposition 8 case, but not in the DOMA 
litigation. 
A.  Intervenor-Defendant Standing in the Trial Court:  
The Defense of Marriage Act 
In the Windsor case, BLAG was permitted to intervene to defend the 
constitutionality of section 3 of DOMA.  An assessment of the ability of 
congressional committees or representatives to intervene in DOMA 
litigation must take account not only of the doctrine of defendant standing, 
but also of the peculiarities of legislative standing.  This section describes 
the Court’s rule for legislators wishing to intervene to defend a law that the 
executive will not defend, and applies it to the efforts of the House of 
Representatives to intervene in DOMA litigation.  The question of the 
intervenors’ standing to defend in Windsor is twofold:  (1) do the 
intervenors possess a sufficient personal stake in their own right, and (2) if 
not, has Congress validly conferred on them the authority to represent the 
federal government’s interest? 
1.  Legislative Standing to Defend 
Under the Court’s legislative standing case law, legislators wishing to 
intervene in federal court actions must establish either a personal injury or 
an injury to the power of Congress to craft legislation.201  Like the plaintiffs 
in Raines, the intervenors do not contend that they have been “singled out 
for specially unfavorable treatment” compared to other members of 
Congress.202  Rather, their claim can only be that their votes for DOMA 
have been “completely nullified” by the President’s actions.203  But the 
Court in Raines took a very restrictive view of legislative standing, holding, 
in pertinent part, that it exists only when a legislative act does not go into 
effect despite the legislator having cast a vote that was “sufficient 
to . . . enact” the Act.204
That standard is plainly not met here.  First, DOMA did go into effect, 
and it remains the law.  Indeed, the President stated that he would continue 
to enforce section 3 of DOMA until it was overturned.
 
205
 
 201. See supra Part I.B. 
  Second, unlike 
the challenged action in Raines, the President’s refusal to defend section 3 
 202. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 821 (1997). 
 203. Id. at 823. 
 204. Id. 
 205. See supra Part II.C. 
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does not single-handedly dictate the result.  The law may or may not be 
overturned; the court could appoint the intervenors or others as amici to 
ensure that it hears vigorous arguments on all sides.  Moreover, the federal 
courts have frequently upheld laws despite the President’s refusal to 
defend.206
2.  Congressional Conferral of Standing to Defend 
  Ultimately, under the restrictive standard of Coleman and 
Raines, the President’s mere refusal to defend the constitutionality of the 
law inflicts no injury on the intervenors, and cannot amount to “complete 
nullification” of their votes. 
The Supreme Court has addressed the standing of legislators to intervene 
as defendants in only one case, Karcher v. May.207  Interestingly, just as in 
the DOMA and Proposition 8 contexts, state executive officials in Karcher 
had refused to defend a law challenged on federal constitutional grounds.208  
As a result, leaders of the New Jersey state legislature intervened in federal 
litigation to defend the statute.209  The Supreme Court held that the 
legislator-intervenors had Article III standing to defend the law in the trial 
court, based on its determination that legislative leaders “had authority 
under state law to represent the State’s interests” by defending a state 
statute that “neither the Attorney General nor the named defendants would 
defend.”210  Thus, standing at the trial court level had been proper.211
The Court, however, went on to find that the legislator-intervenors lacked 
standing, based on changes in their status that occurred after trial.  While 
the case was pending, the intervenors lost their leadership positions, and 
their successors moved to withdraw their appearance.
 
212  The Court rejected 
the intervenors’ request to proceed in their individual capacities, holding 
that the intervenors no longer had standing to defend the law in the 
Supreme Court.213  This determination rested on state law, which, the Court 
held, granted standing to the legislative leaders in their official capacity.  
Thus, once the intervenors had lost their leadership positions, the state law 
right on which their standing was based no longer was theirs to assert.214
Karcher thus holds that Article III restricts who may defend a law, both 
at trial and on appeal, and that standing to defend a state law rests with 
 
 
 206. See Nina Totenberg, U.S. Sends Conflicting Signals on Gay Marriage Law, NPR 
(Mar. 1, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/03/01/134132526/u-s-defends-doma-despite-
dropping-support (enumerating instances when U.S. Presidents have refused to defend laws 
in court, noting that some such laws were subsequently upheld by the Supreme Court). 
 207. 484 U.S. 72 (1987). 
 208. Id. at 82; see also id. at 75. 
 209. Id. at 82. 
 210. Id. at 75, 82. 
 211. Id. at 80. 
 212. Id. at 76. 
 213. Id. at 77 (“The authority to pursue the lawsuit on behalf of the legislature belongs to 
those who succeeded Karcher and Orechio [the intervenor-defendants] in office.”). 
 214. Id. 
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those officials endowed by state law with the authority to represent the 
state’s interest.215
In contrast with the state law at issue in Karcher, Congress has not, as of 
this writing, passed a law or adopted a resolution authorizing the leadership 
of the House of Representatives to represent the federal government’s 
interests in court by defending DOMA, or federal law in general.  Quite the 
contrary:  federal law vests the authority to represent the interests of the 
United States exclusively in the Attorney General, subject only to specified 
exceptions.
 
216  Existing law does require the Attorney General to notify the 
General Counsel of the House of Representatives if he determines that he 
intends to refrain “from defending or asserting, in any judicial, 
administrative, or other proceeding, the constitutionality of any provision of 
any Federal statute.”217
Moreover, even if there were statutory authorization of the sort relied on 
by the Court in Karcher v. May, it is far from clear that such a law would 
satisfy Article III in circumstances involving intervention by federal 
legislators.  In Karcher, the Court deferred to the state of New Jersey’s 
judgments about the appropriate distribution of governmental authority 
between its executive and legislative branches.  In the context of DOMA, 
however, the Court will be constrained by the U.S. Constitution’s scheme 
of separation of powers, and by the risk to the Court’s credibility if it were 
perceived to be taking sides in a dispute between the other two branches.
  Nothing in the statute, however, purports to 
authorize the General Counsel to intervene in event of such notice, or 
confers on the House the authority to represent the interest of the United 
States in defending any law. 
218  
As the Court noted when it denied legislative standing in Raines, “It is 
settled that Congress cannot erase Article III’s standing requirements by 
statutorily granting the right to sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise 
have standing.”219
In sum, because the intervenor-defendants in Windsor seek to raise 
defenses not raised by the original defendant, they should have been 
required to establish Article III standing.  And under the stringent test for 
 
 
 215. Id. at 82 (noting that the legislators were permitted to intervene because state law 
endowed them with authority to defend state laws if the Executive would not). 
 216. See 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2006) (providing that “the conduct of litigation” involving the 
United States is reserved to the Attorney General, “[e]xcept as otherwise authorized by 
law”).  The “otherwise authorized by law” exception to § 516 has been read to require a 
statutory enactment, and not a mere resolution of a single house. See Senate Select Comm. 
on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 366 F. Supp. 51, 56 n.8 (D.D.C. 1973) 
(“[A]ny exception to § 516 must be one ‘authorized by law.’  Although the question has 
never been specifically litigated, it seems apparent that ‘law’ in § 516 would not include a 
legislative action of the sort represented by S.Res. 262.  The term ‘law’ does not normally 
encompass within its definition ‘resolution,’ and all recognized exceptions to § 516, such as 
10 U.S.C. § 1037, are statute laws enacted by both Houses.”).  Thus, the House proceedings 
by which BLAG was authorized to intervene in the various DOMA cases cannot suffice. 
 217. 28 U.S.C. § 530D(a)(1)(B)(ii); see also 2 U.S.C. § 130f(b) (2006). 
 218. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 833 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring). 
 219. Id. at 820 n.3 (majority opinion). 
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legislative standing established in Raines and Coleman, it seems unlikely 
that the Court would find that the intervenor-defendants have standing.  
Because standing to defend is required in the trial court as well as on 
appeal, their motion to intervene should have been denied for lack of 
standing to defend. 
B.  Intervenor-Defendant Standing to Appeal:  Proposition 8 
In Perry v. Schwarzenegger, the initiative proponent, 
ProtectMarriage.com, was permitted to intervene as defendant in the trial 
court without being required to establish standing in its own right.220  But 
because ProtectMarriage.com sought to appeal alone after losing in the trial 
court, the Ninth Circuit raised the question of the defendant’s standing to 
appeal.221
ProtectMarriage.com offered three separate theories in its effort to 
establish standing.  The first involved an injury in fact to the organization 
itself, based on its financial and other expenditures in drafting and 
supporting Proposition 8.  The second was an associational standing theory, 
alleging that the organization had standing to vindicate the rights of its 
individual members.  The third was akin to a legislative standing theory, 
and was premised on the claim that state law confers the state of 
California’s interest in defending a law enacted by ballot initiative on the 
sponsors of the initiative in question, at least where state executive branch 
officials refuse to defend the law. 
 
1.  Organizational Standing to Defend 
An organization can demonstrate the personal stake required by Article 
III in one of two ways:  First, it can sue on its own behalf if it can satisfy 
the same standing test that applies to individuals.222
 
 220. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 928 (N.D. Cal. 2010); aff’d sub 
nom. Perry v. Brown, --- F.3d ----, Nos. 10-16696, 11-16577, 2012 WL 372713 (9th Cir. 
Feb. 7, 2012). 
  Second, it can sue in a 
representative capacity, asserting the rights of its individual members, under 
 221. Perry, --- F.3d ----, 2012 WL 372713, at *2; see also Arizonans for Official English 
v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 65 (1997) (holding that “[a]n intervenor cannot step into the shoes 
of the original party unless the intervenor independently ‘fulfills the requirements of Article 
III’” (quoting Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 68 (1986))). 
 222. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 378–79 (1982) (“In determining 
whether HOME has standing under the Fair Housing Act, we conduct the same inquiry as in 
the case of an individual . . . .”); see also Abigail Alliance for Better Access v. Von 
Eschenbach, 469 F.3d 129, 132 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“‘There is no question that an association 
may have standing in its own right to seek judicial relief from injury to itself and to vindicate 
whatever rights and immunities the association itself may enjoy.’” (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 
422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975))); ACORN v. Fowler, 178 F.3d 350, 356 (5th Cir. 1999) (“An 
organization has standing to sue on its own behalf if it meets the same standing test that 
applies to individuals.”). 
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what is called “associational standing.”223
As to the first, ProtectMarriage.com attempted to establish standing in its 
own right, alleging that its expenditure of money and time in drafting and 
supporting Proposition 8 gives rise to the risk of an injury in fact sufficient 
to permit its defense of the law.
  ProtectMarriage.com alleged 
both theories. 
224
In the plaintiff standing context, the Supreme Court has long held that 
“generalized grievances,” such as the broad desire to have the government 
enforce the law, do not suffice to confer standing on individuals.
  This argument, however, is difficult to 
reconcile with the prohibition on standing based on generalized grievances. 
225  The 
Court has repeatedly held that the appropriate means of redress for injuries 
that are widely shared is through the political branches and not the courts, 
because the courts’ antidemocratic action is legitimate only when necessary 
to protect constitutional rights of a minority.226  When the political 
branches fail to serve the wishes of the majority, the appropriate remedy is 
at the ballot box, not in the courts.227  As the Court held in Diamond v. 
Charles, an ideological desire to defend a statute on the part of a member of 
the general public does not establish an Article III personal stake.228
If ever there was a widely shared grievance, it was the grievance held by 
the majority of California voters who supported Proposition 8 at the ballot 
box against their elected Governor and Attorney General, who refused to 
defend Proposition 8 in court.  Not only did millions of California voters—
52.3 percent of those who cast ballots—support Proposition 8, tens of 
thousands of them gave money or time in support of its passage.
 
229
 
 223. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972) (recognizing the right of 
an organization to represent injured members); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 
U.S. 449, 459 (1958) (recognizing the NAACP’s standing to represent its members and 
challenge a state law forcing it to disclose membership lists); see also Hunt v. Wash. State 
Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977) (referring to the doctrine as 
“associational standing”). 
  Indeed, 
 224. See Brief for Defendant-Intervenors-Appellants at 22, Perry, --- F.3d ----, Nos. 10-
16696, 11-16577, available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2010/09/22/
10-16696_openingbrief.pdf; see also Brief for Appellees at 33, Perry, --- F.3d ----, Nos. 10-
16696, 11-16577, available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2010/10/27/
Answering_Brief2.pdf. 
 225. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 575–76 (1992). 
 226. See id. at 576 (“Vindicating the public interest (including the public interest in 
Government observance of the Constitution and laws) is the function of Congress and the 
Chief Executive.”). 
 227. See id. at 576–77; Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499–500 (1975); see also Scalia, 
supra note 58, at 881. 
 228. Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 65 (1986) (“Because the State alone is entitled to 
create a legal code, only the State has the kind of ‘direct stake’ identified in Sierra Club v. 
Morton . . . in defending the standards embodied in that code.”). 
 229. The dollar value of 2008 contributions to “Yes on 8” through the National 
Organization for Marriage and ProtectMarriage.com totaled nearly $42,000,000, while the 
total number of donations was at least 46,941. See Campaign Finance:  Proposition 008 – 
Eliminates Right of Same-Sex Couples to Marry. Initiative Constitutional Amendment, CAL. 
SECRETARY ST., http://cal-access.sos.ca.gov/Campaign/Measures/Detail.aspx?id=1302602&
session=2007 (last visited Feb. 23, 2012). 
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many individuals donated five and six-figure sums to support Proposition 
8.230  Thus, the stake alleged by ProtectMarriage.com is not 
“particularized” in the way that Article III requires.231  Rather, it might 
fairly be characterized as “only a generally available grievance about 
government—claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s interest in 
proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no 
more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large.”232  
The Court has “consistently held” that such an alleged injury “does not state 
an Article III case or controversy.”233
Moreover, recognizing organizational standing for ProtectMarriage.com 
raises a related problem of judicial administration.  If financial and other 
investments in support of a ballot proposition were sufficient to confer 
standing to defend the resulting law, then not only ProtectMarriage.com, 
but many others, including countless individuals, would have standing to 
defend Proposition 8.  If standing is granted on an individual injury theory, 
it is difficult to identify a principled basis for granting standing to the 
official sponsor of a ballot proposition, but denying it to the thousands of 
individuals who made significant financial or other investments in the 
proposition’s passage.  
 
2.  Associational Standing to Defend 
The second theory of standing that ProtectMarriage.com asserted is an 
associational standing theory.  The Court in Hunt v. Washington State Apple 
Advertising Commission234 held that an organization seeking standing to 
litigate on behalf of its members must show three things:  “(a) its members 
would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it 
seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither 
the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of 
individual members in the lawsuit.”235
Although the second and third prongs of the Hunt test are likely 
satisfied,
 
236
 
 230. Matthai Kuruvila, Mormons Denounced over Prop. 8, S.F. CHRONICLE, Oct. 27, 
2008, at B1; Jesse McKinley & Kirk Johnson, Mormons Tipped Scale in Ban on Gay 
Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2008, at A1 (discussing five to seven-figure donations to the 
“Yes on 8” campaign by various Mormon families). 
 ProtectMarriage.com’s associational standing argument is 
likely to fail the first prong, because it is difficult to envision an individual 
 231. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61 & n.1. 
 232. Id. at 573–74. 
 233. Id. 
 234. 432 U.S. 333 (1977). 
 235. Id. at 342–43 (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511, 515 (1975)). 
 236. As to the second prong, “[t]he germaneness test is relatively loose,” and is satisfied 
where the interests at issue are “pertinen[t]” to the organization’s purpose. Hazardous Waste 
Treatment Council v. EPA, 861 F.2d 277, 286 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see also Nathaniel B. 
Edmonds, Associational Standing for Organizations with Internal Conflicts of Interest, 69 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 351, 360 (2002) (providing additional context as to the germaneness test).  The 
third prong, too, is easily satisfied, so long as the organization’s individual members are not 
seeking compensatory damages. Warth, 422 U.S. at 515. 
1582 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
 
member who could establish standing in light of the prohibition on 
generalized grievances.237  When an “asserted injury arises from the 
government’s allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of 
someone else . . . standing is not precluded, but it is ordinarily ‘substantially 
more difficult’ to establish.”238  A member’s mere concern with a social 
issue is not enough to satisfy the standing requirement; there must be an 
identifiable, concrete injury suffered by at least one member of the 
organization.239
3.  Quasi-legislative Standing to Defend 
  No such injury is apparent here. 
Finally, in addition to seeking standing in their individual capacities, the 
initiative sponsors argued that they have authority under state law to 
represent the interests of the People of the State of California.240  This 
argument is based on the People’s reserved authority to exercise the 
legislative power, and casts initiative sponsors as representatives of the 
people, exercising delegated authority to represent the state’s own 
interest.241  ProtectMarriage.com argued that the unique nature of the 
initiative process requires that sponsors be permitted to defend an initiative 
measure, at least when state officials refuse to do so.242  “[P]ermitting 
official proponents to defend initiatives when public officials refuse to do 
so vindicates the People’s initiative power,” and thereby ensures “‘the 
people’s rightful control over their government.’”243  A contrary rule, they 
argued, would frustrate the provisions of the California constitution that 
created the initiative process, by permitting recalcitrant elected officials to 
effectively veto duly adopted initiatives.244
 
 237. Standing does not exist when “the asserted harm is a ‘generalized grievance’ shared 
in a substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens.” Warth, 422 U.S. at 499; 
see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573–74 (1992). 
 
 238. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562 (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 758 (1984)). 
 239. Warth, 422 U.S. at 515; see also Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 
379 (1982) (finding standing where alleged injury was “far more than simply a setback to the 
organization’s abstract social interests”). 
 240. Defendant-Intervenors-Appellants’ Opening Brief at 19, Perry v. Brown, 
--- F.3d ----, Nos. 10-16696, 11-16577 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2012), available at 
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2010/09/22/10-16696_openingbrief.pdf. But 
see Brief for Appellees, supra note 224, at 29. 
 241. Defendant-Intervenors-Appellants’ Opening Brief, supra note 240, at 19. 
 242. Id. at 21–22. 
 243. Defendant-Intervenors and Appellants’ Reply to Amicus Briefs at 4–5, Perry, 
--- F.3d ----, Nos. 10-16696, 11-16577 (certifying questions to No. S189476) (Cal. argued 
Sept. 6, 2011), 2011 WL 2357942 (quoting Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 84 (Cal. 2009)). 
 244. See id. at 6–8 (arguing that because no public official has veto power over initiatives, 
“it is doubtful . . . that such officials ‘may, consistent with the California Constitution, 
achieve through a refusal to litigate what [they] may not do directly:  effectively veto the 
initiative by refusing to defend it or appeal a judgment invalidating it if no one else—
including the initiative’s proponents—is qualified to do so’”) (second alteration in original) 
(internal citation omitted); see also CAL. CONST. art. 2, § 1.  The U.S. Supreme Court has 
linked the power to create laws with the power to defend them, which lends some credence 
to ProtectMarriage.com’s argument. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 65 (1986) 
(“Because the State alone is entitled to create a legal code, only the State has the kind of 
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Karcher v. May and a later case, factually very similar to the Proposition 
8 litigation, provide insight into these arguments.  In Karcher, as we have 
seen, the Court accepted New Jersey’s representation that state law 
permitted the legislature to defend the challenged law, and held that such a 
state-conferred interest was sufficient for Article III standing.  In Arizonans 
for Official English v. Arizona,245 the Court applied a similar analysis in a 
case addressing the standing of the sponsors of a ballot proposition to 
defend the measure against a federal constitutional challenge.246  The Ninth 
Circuit had held that the sponsors had standing in the same way that the 
state legislators had standing in Karcher.247
The Supreme Court in Arizonans vacated the opinion of the Court of 
Appeals, and ultimately dismissed the case on abstention grounds, to permit 
state courts to determine the nature of any interest that state law conferred 
on ballot proposition sponsors.
 
248  Along the way, however, the Court 
expressed “grave doubts” as to whether the intervenors had Article III 
standing to appeal.249  In particular, the Court expressed skepticism about 
the sponsors’ assertion of a “quasi-legislative interest” that would support 
standing, noting that the sponsors were neither elected by the people nor, as 
in Karcher, appointed by state law “as agents of the people of Arizona to 
defend, in lieu of public officials, the constitutionality of initiatives made 
law of the State.”250  Thus, the Court suggested that a state law authorizing 
ballot proposition sponsors to represent the interests of the state would have 
supported standing, as in Karcher, but it found no such state law on the 
books.251
Applying this analysis to the Proposition 8 litigation, it appears that the 
state law question of whether initiative sponsors are authorized by 
California law to represent the state’s interest in litigation concerning the 
validity or enforcement of the measures they sponsor ought to dictate the 
result of the federal standing question.  The California Supreme Court held 
in November 2011 that state law does confer the state’s interest in 
defending an initiative on the sponsors thereof, at least where responsible 
executive branch officials refuse to defend.
 
252  This state law rule, under the 
holding in Karcher, confers on ProtectMarriage.com a sufficient stake in 
the outcome to support Article III jurisdiction.253
As this Article went to press, the Ninth Circuit panel in Perry handed 
down its decision, holding that ProtectMarriage.com did have standing to 
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appeal the district court’s judgment.254  The panel’s decision exemplifies 
the approach set forth in this Article.  The panel asked the right question—
whether the intervenors had either a personal stake or the authority to assert 
the state’s own interest—and thoughtfully analyzed the case law before 
arriving at the correct conclusion.255
CONCLUSION 
  But defendant standing all too 
frequently escapes notice.  Current doctrine provides inadequate, and at 
times downright misleading, guidance to lower courts, which unsurprisingly 
results in erroneous decisions, such as the incorrect decisions to permit 
intervention in Windsor and other DOMA cases, and under-theorized 
decisions, such as the initial intervention ruling by the district court in 
Perry.  A clearer understanding of standing—as a symmetrical requirement 
of personal stake on both sides of the case—would facilitate better decision 
making by simplifying the doctrine and pushing courts to give explicit 
consideration to the various policies that the doctrine means to serve. 
Current doctrine treats standing principally as a limitation on who may 
sue.  But case law, the text of Article III, and the policies underlying the 
standing requirement all support the notion that, in every case, defendants 
must also have a personal stake in the outcome.  Recognizing that Article 
III applies to defendants as well as plaintiffs would bring standing doctrine 
into closer alignment with the results in many standing cases.  No less 
importantly, it would provide better guidance to lower courts regarding the 
circumstances in which intervenor-defendants may be permitted to litigate 
in federal court. 
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